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K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc.: Attention
Gray Market Shoppers, The United
States Supreme Court Has Saved Your
Bargain Prices

In the past decade American companies are estimated to have lost

billions of dollars in annual sales due to competition from "gray
market" goods.1 Sometimes called "diverted ' 2 goods or "parallel
imports," ' 3 gray market goods bear genuine trademarks but are

1. Gerber and Bender, The Grey Market, A Legal Enigma, 59 N.Y. ST. B.J. 41, 42
(Jan. 1987) [hereinafter Gerber and Bender] ("In 1985 an estimated ten billion dollars worth
of gray market goods entered the United States .. . ."); See also Steele, Piracy and Gray
Markets, 10 HASTiNGS CoMM. & Er. L.J. 1065, 1065 (1988) [hereinafter Steele] ("Parallel
importation and gray market cases have been a controversial and rapidly evolving area of
trademark law during the past ten years"); Donohue, The Use of Copyright Law to Prevent
the Importation of "Genuine Goods" I1 N.C.J. INT'L L. & Com. REG. 181, (1986) [hereinafter
Donohue] ("United States subsidiaries or affiliates of foreign corporations and U.S. companies
with foreign subsidiaries find their domestic distribution networks increasingly threatened by
the unauthorized importation of goods substantially similar to the goods they market.") Id.
at 181; Mackintosh, Grey Market Imports, Burgeoning Crisis or Emerging Policy, 11 N.C.J.
INT'L L. & CoM. Rim. 293 (1986) [hereinafter Mackintosh] ("The trade and economic problems
presented by [gray market imports] have so affected U.S. industry that Congress officially
urged the Reagan Administration to present a grey market policy statement by the end of
1985.") Id. at 293; See also Brief for Respondents Coalition to Preserve the Integrity of
-U.S.,
American Trademarks (COPIAT) at 3, n.2, K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc.,
108 S.Ct. 1811 (1988) [hereinafter Brief for Respondents] (available at THE TRANSNATIONAL
LAWYER offices) (Counsel for the respondents asserted that "[t]he gray market bloomed in
the early 1980's").
2. In the lower court decision of K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc. the court referred to
"diverted goods," "parallel goods" and "gray market goods" synonymously. Coalition to
Preserve the Integrity of American Trademarks (COPIAT) v. United States, 598 F.Supp. 844,
846 (D.D.C. 1984), rev'd 790 F.2d 903 (D.C. Cir. 1986), jurisdiction aff'd sub nom. K Mart
Corp. v. Cartier, Inc. ... U.S-. , 108 S.Ct 950 (March 7, 1988); aff'd in part and rev'd
in part 108 S.Ct. 1811 (May 31, 1988).
3. "Parallel importations" are defined as goods bearing a U.S. trademark that are
imported without "authorization" by foreign entities at the same time the U.S. trademark
owner imports his goods. See Vivitar Corp. v. United States, 761 F.2d 1552, 1555 (Fed. Cir.
1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1055 (1986).
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imported without the consent of the domestic owner of the trademark. 4 The loss of sales due to the competition from gray goods has
created great incentive for business plaintiffs in the United States to
test the legality of gray market importation. Consequently, the vol-

ume of litigation in this area has increased in recent years. 5

All three branches of the United States Government have struggled

with the problems that the gray market presents .6 In 1985, at the
urging of Congress, the Reagan Administration created an interagency working group to study the gray market and formulate a
government policy. 7 The working group produced six options for a
government policy position, but did not recommend one as being the

most preferable. 8 Thus, the area of gray market imports has been
one of legislative indecision.

4. The United States Supreme Court defined a gray market good as a "foreign-made
good, bearing a valid United States trademark, that is imported without the consent of the
U.S. trademark holder." K Mart Corp v. Cartier, Inc., ..-.. _U.S-,
108 S.Ct. 1811, 1814
(1988); See generally Vivitar Corp. v. United States, 761 F.2d 1552, 1555 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
5. Gerber and Bender, supra note 1, at 42. ("In the last few years, an avalanche of
gray market claims have been filed."). See generally Vivitar Corp. v. United States, 761 F.2d
1552 (Fed. Cir. 1985), aff'g 593 F.Supp. 420 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1984), cert. denied, 474 U.S.
1055 (1986); Olympus Corp. v. United States, 792 F.2d 315 (2d Cir. 1986), aff'g 627 F.Supp.
911 (E.D.N.Y 1985), cert. denied, -U.S-,
108 S.Ct. 2033 (1987); Lever Brothers Co.
v. United States, 652 F.Supp. 403 (D.C. Cir. 1987); Original Appalachian Artworks, Inc. v.
Granada Electronics, Inc., 816 F.2d 68 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, ..
U.S-,
108 S Ct.
143 (1987); NEC Electronics V. Cal. Circuit Abco, 810 F.2d 1506 (9th Cir. 1987).
6. See Mackintosh, supra note 1, at 293. The numerous cases heard by the Judiciary are
cited throughout this Note. Periodically bills supporting both sides of the issue are proposed
in Congress. See infra note 335. The Executive branch, in addition to promulgating the
Customs Service Regulations at issue in the K Mart case, rendered a policy decision concerning
the gray market by disapproving a determination of the United States International Trade
Commission regarding the trademark "Duracell." In the Matter of Certain Alkaline Batteries,
6 I.T.R.D. (BNA) 1849, reprinted in 225 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 862 (disapproved pursuant to 19
U.S.C. §1337(g) (1982)), appeal dismissed sub nom. Duracell, Inc. v. United States Int'l Trade
Comm'n, 778 F.2d 1578 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (President Reagan disapproved an International
Trade Commission holding that Duracell Batteries manufactured in Belgium should be excluded
from importation. The I.T.C. based its determination on the grounds that American consumers
would confuse the Belgian-made batteries with ones made in the United States. The President
disapproved the I.T.C. decision for policy reasons. He stated that it conflicted with longstanding
agency interpretation which has been supported by the Administration. Further, a process of
policy formulation was under way which might have been undermined by a change in policy
prior to an ultimate decision.) Id.
7. Mackintosh, supra note 1, at 294 nn.2-4.
8. Mackintosh, supra note 1, at 293.
The following options were presented to the Cabinet Council on Commerce and Trade:
i. Maintain the present policy of allowing grey market imports where the foreign
and U.S. trademark owners are related and the foreign articles bear a recorded
trademark authorized by a U.S. owner.
ii. Allow grey market imports, but impose mandatory labeling to inform consumers
that grey goods are neither authorized nor warranted by the U.S. trademark owner,
and are not subject to the same warranty and service benefits as U.S. goods.
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In the recent case of K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc.9 the United
States Supreme Court had the opportunity to make a definitive
statement regarding the status of gray market goods. The case is

significant because it is the first time in decades that the Court has
agreed to hear a gray market case. 10 In K Mart Corp. v. Cartier

Inc., the Court considered a facial challenge to specific provisions
of the Customs Service Regulations" which permit the importation

iii. Amend § 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930 (19 U.S.C. § 1337 (1982)) to make it
easier to challenge grey market imports before the U.S. International Trade Commission.
iv. Continue to allow the entry of grey market imports that are identical to their
domestic counterparts.
v. Allow the entry of grey market imports only if the infringing trademark is
removed or obliterated.
vi. Prohibit grey market imports without the written consent of the U.S. trademark
owner.
Id. at 293-4 n.4 (citing INSmE U.S. TRADE, April 26, 1985, Annex).
9. On May 31, 1988 the long lived case of K Mart Corp. v. Cartier Inc.,
-U.S.
-,
108 S.Ct. 1811 (1988) was finally decided by the United States Supreme Court. The
court split five Justices to four in upholding one portion of the Customs Service Regulations
at issue, and in a different configuration of Justices, split five to four in favor of invalidating
another portion. Justices Kennedy, White, Brennan, Marshall and Stevens comprised the
plurality which upheld one portion. A different plurality of Kennedy, Rehnquist, Blackmun,
O'Connor and Scalia voted to invalidate the other portion. The plurality opinion of the Court
was authored by Justice Kennedy, who was joined in part by Justice White. Justice Brennan,
joined by Justices Marshall and Stevens, authored an opinion concurring in part and dissenting
in part, in which Justice White joined in part. Justice Scalia authored another opinion
concurring in part and dissenting in part, and was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justices
O'Connor, and Blackmun. Coalition to Preserve the Integrity of American Trademarks
(COPIAT) v. United States, 598 F.Supp. 844, 846 (D. D.C.1984), rev'd 790 F.2d 903 (D.C.
Cir. 1986), jurisdiction aff'd sub nom. K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc.
-.U.S-,
108
S.Ct. 950 (March 7, 1988); aff'd in part and rev'd in part .U.S-,
108 S.Ct. 1811
(May 31, 1988).
10. The last case to be heard by the U.S. Supreme Court concerning the gray market was
A. Bourjois & Co. v. Katzel, 260 U.S. 689 (1923), rev'g. 275 F. 539 (2nd Cir. 1921). For a
further discussion of Katzel see infra text accompanying notes 56-57; see also Note, Original
Appalachian Artworks, Inc. v. Granada Electronics, Inc.: The Cabbage Patch Doll Goes
Gray?, 1 TRANSN'L LAw. 339, 342 n.20 (1988) referring to Vivitar Corp. v. United States, 761
F.2d. 1552, 1561 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
11. The Custom Service Regulation, § 133.21, provides in pertinent part:
(b) Identical trademark. Foreign-made articles bearing a trademark identical with
one owned and recorded by a citizen of the United States or a corporation or
association created or organized within the United States are subject to seizure and
forfeiture as prohibited importations.
(c) Restrictions not applicable. The restrictions set forth in paragraphol... (b) of
this section do not apply to imported articles when:
(1) Both the foreign and the U.S. trademark or trade name are owned by
the same person or business entity;
(2) The foreign and domestic trademark or trade name owners are parent
and subsidiary companies or are otherwise subject to common ownership
or control ... ;
(3) The articles of foreign manufacture bear a recorded trademark or trade
name applied under authorization of the U.S. owner; ....
19 C.F.R. § 133.21(b) & (c) (1988).
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of certain categories of gray market goods into the United States.

2

Plaintiffs alleged that the Customs Service Regulations were contrary

to the express language and intent of the controlling federal statute,
Section 526 of the Tariff Act, 13 the literal language of which appears
to exclude all gray market goods from importation. 14 In a plurality

decision, the Court struck down one portion of the Regulations as
inconsistent with the statute.' 5 However, the portion of the
Regulations 6 which most concerned the plaintiffs was upheld by a

majority of five members of the Court. 7 The practical result of the
case was a continued frustration for United States trademark owners
to compel the Customs Service to bar the importation of most gray
market goods. 8 There are, however, many questions left unresolved
by the K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc. decision.
One question that was not answered in K Mart Corp. v. Cartier,

Inc. involves the nature of the trademark rights acquired by a
registrant in the United States. As one commentator phrases it, the
United States Supreme Court has not satisfactorily answered the

question of what "a trademark owner owns" in relation to the rights

12. K Mart, 108 S.Ct. at 1814.
13. The Genuine Goods Exclusion Act is codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1526 (1982).
14. Section 526 provides in pertinent part:
[I]t shall be unlawful to import into the United States any merchandise of Foreign
manufacture if such merchandise, or the label, sign, print, package, wrapper, or
receptacle, bears a trade-mark owned by a citizen of, or by a corporation or
association created or organized within, the United States, and registered in the
Patent Office by a person domiciled in the United States....
19 U.S.C. § 1526 (1982).
15. K Mart Corp. v. Cartier,Inc.,
-U.S
-,
108 S.Ct. 1811, 1819 (1988).
16. See Customs Service Regulations, supra note 11. The "common control" exception
of the Customs Service Regulations is embodied in 19 C.F.R. § 133.21(c)(1) and (2).
17. K Mart, 108 S.Ct. at 1819; see also Brief for Respondents, supra note 1, at 4.
[Tihe United States trademark owners subjected to the inroads of the gray market
are American companies, incorporated and domiciled in the United States. In some
cases, ... such as that of the named plaintiff Cartier, Inc., the American owner of
the United States trademark is a partially or wholly owned subsidiary of a foreign
company that owns the identical mark abroad. In many other cases, such as those
of the United States automobile manufacturers, Duracell, Proctor & Gamble, and
Eastman Kodak, the owner of the United States trademark is a United States
producer. It either has plants abroad itself or has a foreign subsidiary that manufactures and distributes goods abroad with the same mark....
Id. at 4. (In these examples of business relationships, the two companies are under "common
control").
18. The "common control" exception was held to be valid in K Mart Corp. v. Cartier,
Inc.,
-. U.S-,
108 S.Ct. 1811, 1819 (1988). This results in the continuation of the U.S.
Customs Service practice which allows unimpeded importation of the large percentage of gray
market goods which fall within this exception. See infra text accompanying notes 58 and 27375.
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he has to obtain a legal exclusion of gray market imports. 19 While

the Court does resolve this issue for a certain class of trademark
owners, 20 it leaves the issue open for others. 21 A second question

insufficiently addressed in K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc. involves the
economic policy implications arising from the ability of some trade-

mark owners to bar importation of gray market goods
Section 526 of the Tariff Act. Such an ability to exclude
from imports raises the question of what role antitrust
should play in the implementation of Section 526. 22

by invoking
competition
policy goals
Finally, the

United States Supreme Court in K Mart Corp. v. Cartier,Inc. failed

to address the effect of the decision on treaty obligations of the
United States government. 23 International trade treaties often have

"national treatment" clauses which require equal legal treatment for
foreign companies as compared to domestic ones4 The U.S. Supreme
Court's construction of Section 526 may facilitate discrimination
against foreign business entities in violation of these "national treatment" clauses. By neglecting to address this issue in K Mart Corp.

v. Cartier, Inc., the Court has provided no guidance for United
States trademark owners or gray market importers as to how this
issue may be resolved in the future.?
There have been many articles in scholarly journals describing the
legal history of gray market goods. 26 Attempting to avoid duplication,

this Note will focus on questions raised by the decision of the United
19. Palmeter, Gray Market Imports: No Black and White Answer, 22 J. WORLD TRADE
89, 89 (1988) [hereinafter Palmeter].
20. See infra text accompanying notes 235-41 and 291-95.
21. See infra text accompanying notes 264-90.
22. See infra text accompanying notes 296-332.
23. Justice Kennedy briefly mentions the issue of treaty obligations in his opinion. K
Mart, 108 S.Ct. at 1833.
24. See infra text accompanying note 252.
25. See infra text accompanying notes 249-65.
26. See generally Donohue, supra note 1; Gerber and Bender, supra note 1; Mackintosh,
supra note 1; Steele, supra note 1; Takamatsu, Parallel Importation of Trademarked Goods:
A Comparative Analysis, 57 WAsH. L. Rav. 433 (1982); Palmeter, supra note 19; Kersner and
Stein, Judicial Constructionof Section 526 and the Importation of Grey Market Goods: From
Total Exclusion to Unimpeded Entry 11 N.C.J. INT'L L. & CoM.REG. 251 (1986) [hereinafter
Kersner and Stein]; Gorelick and Little, 11 N.C.J. INT'L L. & Com. REG. 205, 211. (1986)
[hereinafter Gorelick]; Note, Original Appalachian Artworks, Inc. v. Granada Electronics,
Inc.: The Cabbage Patch Doll Goes Gray?, 1 TR4SN'L LAW. 339 (1988); Note, Emerging
Gray Market Balance: A Global Perspective on Solutionsfor the Nineties, 10 HAsTrNGs Comm.
& ENr. L.J. 1101 (1988); Note, The Gray Market Controversy and the Court: An Analysis of
Conflicting Court of Appeals Decisions on the Validity of Customs Regulations Permitting
UnauthorizedThird Party Importation of Trademarked Goods, 18 SETON HALL L.R. 55 (1988);
Note, Vivitar Corp. v. United States: The Beginning of the End of the Gray Market 35 AM.
U.L. Ray. 1207 (1986); Note Vivitar Corp. v. United States: Protection Against Gray Market
Goods Under 19 U.S.C. Section 1526, 60 S. CAL L.Rnv. 179 (1986).
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States Supreme Court in K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc.. In deciding
the case on the narrow legal issues of statutory interpretation, the
Court has left to Congress and the Executive branch the duty of

deciding the difficult policy issues27 and creating legislation accordingly.2 These issues are examined in Section III of this Note entitled
Legal Ramifications. An analysis of the legal background to the K
Mart Corp. v. Cartier Inc. decision (Section I) and of the decision
itself (Section II) precedes discussion of the legal ramifications.
I.

A.

LEGAL BACKGROUND

The Gray Market

As defined by the United States Supreme Court, the term "gray
market" refers to a situation where a product manufactured in
country "A," bearing a genuine trademark registered in country
"B," is imported into country "B" without the consent of the
trademark owner in country "B." 29 Commentators have suggested
that the gray market "is created when an arbitrageur takes advantage
of a price difference between two markets by buying in the market
where prices are lower and selling in the market where prices are
higher." ' 30 Goods produced and sold in country "A" for a low price
may be imported into country "B," where its domestic market
supports a relatively higher price for identically trademarked goods.
If transportation costs and tariffs are less than the price difference

27. See Mackintosh, supra note 1, at 296.
28. See infra text accompanying note 234.
29. K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc.,
.U.S-,
108 S.Ct. 1811, 1814 (1988) (Opinion
of Justice Kennedy). Of course, a gray market situation may arise in any country, with the
trademark owner of each country seeking protection under its own domestic laws from the
unauthorized importation of its trademarked goods. See generally Takamatsu, supra note 26
at 440-52 (1982) (referring to the gray market in other countries); Kersten, EEC Antitrust
Policy on 'Grey Market' Exports and Imports Within the Common Market, 16 INT'L Bus.
LAw. 134 (March 1988).
30. W. Goebel Porzellanfabrik v. Action Industries, 589 F. Supp. 763, 764 n.1 (S.D.N.Y.
1984). Arbitrage is defined as the simultaneous purchase in one market and sale in another of
a security or commodity in hope of making a profit on price differences in the different
markets. BLACK's LAw DICTiONARY 95 (5th ed. 1979). If the gray market results solely from
arbitrage, its future in the United States may be limited. "The gray market phenomenon arose
rapidly in the United States during the early 1980's as the dollar appreciated strongly against
most other currencies. With the decline of the dollar in the latter half of the decade, the gray
market is likely to recede in the United States just as rapidly." The gray market will "shift
to the markets of those countries whose currencies have appreciated," and thus continue to
exist as a problem for the international trading system. Palmeter, supra note 19, at 92; see
also Gerber and Bender, supra note 1, at 42.
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between country "A" and country "B," the gray marketeer may
compete effectively by underselling the goods of the trademark owner
from country "B."
American companies claiming to be harmed by the gray market
assert that the gray marketeers are really "free riding" on the
promotion, marketing, and service costs that are paid for by the
domestic trademark holder. 3 ' The gray market importers benefit from
the goodwill generated from these services without contributing to
their costs. The opponents of the gray market conclude that, were it
not for the "free riding" that makes gray market importation
profitable 32, the gray market would not exist.3 3 Proponents of the
gray market claim that the arguments of those who support the gray
market are "no more than camouflage for efforts to gouge American
' 34
consumers by requiring them to pay more than consumers abroad.
As noted above, the most conspicuous advantage of the gray
market is the lower prices for consumers .35 However, gray market
opponents list numerous disadvantages to the consumer resulting
from the purchase of gray goods. Although they bear genuine trademarks, the gray goods are sometimes different from goods manufactured for the American market.3 6 Product ingredients, safety features,
and electronic frequency requirements often differ between one country and another. 37 Any incompatibility of gray market goods with
American standards will result in a harm to the consumer, who may
not be able to use the product safely, or at all .3 8 Furthermore, gray

31. These costs are incurred for product design, advertising, trade show exhibits, training
programs, and service. Brief for Respondents, supra note 1 at 5-6; see also, Vivitar Corp. v.
United States, 761 F.2d 1552, 1556 (Fed. Cir. 1985) and Osawa & Co. v. B & H Photo, 589
F.Supp. 1163, 1166 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
32. Brief for Respondents, supra note 1, at 6. See also Gerber and Bender, supra note
1, at 42, stating that "In the United States, gray market goods frequently sell at prices 20%30% less than essentially identical products sold through the authorized domestic distribution
network."
33. Brief for Respondents, supra note 1, at 5-6. Osawa, 589 F.Supp. at 1166.
34. Gerber and Bender, supra note 1, at 42. (At the extreme, the ability of trademark
owners to exert their monopoly power and sustain higher prices for their goods may be seen
as a result of excessive protection provided to them by trademark law. This follows from the
premise that if profits in the market are too high, the trademark protection must be too great.
On the other hand, society may be willing to pay the costs in exchange for the benefits it
reaps from trademarks).
35. See Fitzpatrick & Brunet, Barring Importation of Gray Goods Under §42 of the
Lanham Act, and §526 of the Tariff Act in GRAY MARKETS AND PARALLEL IMPORTATION:
PROTECTIONISM VS. FREE TRADE- PATENTS, COPYRIGHTS, TRADEMARKS,

AND LInRARY PROP-

ERTY: Course Series Number 217, 9 (1986) [hereinafter Fitzpatrick & Brunet].
36. Brief for Respondents, supra note 1, at 7-8.
37. Brief for Respondents, supra note 1, at 7-8.
38. Id. at 8.
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market goods often fail to carry appropriate manufacturer's warranties that consumers associate with a certain product, 9 resulting in
purchaser disappointment and harm to the goodwill of the United
States trademark holder. 40
Part of the reason that the legal issue of gray market importation
has not yet been resolved in the United States is the relative merits
of both sides of the dialogue. Real harms and benefits to consumers
must be balanced in the process of formulating a gray market policy.
In addition, a broader concern in a weighing of the merits of free
trade versus protectionism will play a role in a legislative determi4
nation of the issue. 1
B. Forms of the Gray Market
There are a number of different forms of gray market importation,
with each form having its own legal impact. 42 When considering the
applicable law as it affects the gray market, these forms may fall
within or without its scope. The question becomes whether the type
of gray market importation at issue was intended to be covered by
the relevant law. The distinction between the forms lies in the nature
of the relationship between the trademark owner and the manufacturer (or distributor) of the product. The United States Supreme
Court described three different categories of relationships in its
analysis of K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc. 43
1. Case 1." U.S. Firm "Acquires Trademark" From
Independent Foreign Firm
The Supreme Court declared the "prototypical' ' 4 victim of the
gray market to be an American firm that "purchases from an
independent foreign firm the rights to register and use the latter's
trademark as a United States trademark and to sell its foreignmanufactured products here." 4 The problem in this scenario is the

39. Id.
40. Fitzpatrick & Brunet, supra note 35, at 11.
41. Steele, supra note 1, at 1073.
42. K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., ... U.S-,
108 S.Ct. 1811, 1814 (1988).
43. Id. at 1814-15.
44. Id. at 1814.
45. For an example of the prototypical gray market case corresponding to the Court's
case I scenario see A. Bourjois & Co. v. Katzel, 275 F. 539 (2d Cir. 1921), rev'd 260 U.S.
689 (1923).
46. K Mart, 108 S.Ct. at 1814.
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United States trademark owner's risk of losing its investment in the
rights contemplated at the purchase of the trademark.4 7 If the foreign
firm which sold the right to use the trademark to the American firm
could import goods with the identical trademark into the United
States, those goods would create intrabrand competition with the
American firm. 48 The unanticipated competition from the foreign
firm's identically trademarked goods dilutes the American firm's
expected profits from its investment in the trademark. 49 The American
company is harmed in a similar manner if a third party purchases
the trademarked goods abroad and imports them into the United
States parallel to the American company's importation. 0
2.

Case 2: U.S. Trademark Owner "Affiliated" With a Firm
That Manufactures The Goods Abroad

The most common gray market context, and the one in which
most of the recent litigation has arisen, Case 2, 51 concerns a transnational affiliation of business entities. There are three subdivisions
in the Case 2 context. Case 2a involves a foreign parent company
which incorporates a subsidiary in the United States to facilitate the
distribution of its goods in the American market. Conversely, an
American parent company may create a foreign subsidiary, Case 2b,
or a foreign unincorporated division of its own, Case 2c, to manu-

47. K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc.,
-U.S-,
108 S.Ct. 1811, 1814 (1988).
48. Id.
49. Id. at 1815.
50. Id.
51. See Coalition to Preserve the Integrity of American Trademarks (COPIAT) v. United
States, 598 F.Supp. 844, 846 (D. D.C.1984), rev'd 790 F.2d 903 (D.C. Cir. 1986), jurisdiction
aff'd sub nom. K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc.
-U.S-,
108 S.Ct 950 (March 7, 1988),
aff'd in part and rev'd in part 108 S.Ct. 1811 (May 31, 1988) (Many COPIAT members were
subsidiaries to foreign parents, Case 2a); Vivitar Corp. v. United States, 761 F.2d 1552, (Fed.
Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1055 (1986) (American parent with a foreign subsidiary,
Case 2b); Olympus Corp. v. United States, 792 F.2d 315, (2d Cir. 1986), cert denied
U.S., 108 S.Ct. 2033 (1988) (Foreign parent with American subsidiary, Case 2a); In the Matter
of Certain Alkaline Batteries, 6 I.T.R.D. (BNA) 1849, reprinted in 225 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 823
(1984, disapproved by President Reagan, 50 Fed. Reg. 1655, reprinted in 225 U.S.P.Q. (BNA)
862 (disapproved pursuant to 19 U.S.C. § 1337(g) (1982)), appeal dismissed sub nom. Duracell,
Inc. v. United States Int'l Trade Comm'n, 778 F.2d 1578 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (American Parent
with foreign subsidiary, Case 2b); NEC Electronics v. Cal Circuit Abco, 810 F.2d 1506, (9th
Cir. 1987) (Foreign parent with American subsidiary, Case 2a); Parfums Stem, Inc. v. U.S.
Customs Service, 575 Fed.Supp. 416, (S.D. Fla. 1983) (Foreign parent with American subsidiary,
Case 2a); Disnenos Artisticos E Industriales, S.A. v. Work, 676 F.Supp. 1254 (E.D.N.Y. 1987)
(Foreign parent with American subsidiary, Case 2a).
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facture goods abroad for importation into the United States.5 2 As in

the Case I scenario, the American firm can be injured by competition
from gray market goods if the manufacturing entity, or more likely,

a third party53 imports the goods parallel5 4 to the American firm.
3. Case 3: U.S. Owner "Authorizes the Use" of the Trademark
to a Foreign Firm
The final gray market context is the converse of Case 1. In Case
3, the United States trademark holder sells (or authorizes the use of)
the mark to a foreign company for foreign manufacture. 5 The critical
factor here is that the American trademark owner has no link of

control in common with the foreign user, other than the terms in
their contract. If the purchasing company (or a third party) imports
those goods into the United States, the goods will be in gray market

56
competition with the American firm's goods.
These distinctions are drawn because each variation has a charac-

teristic which influences the analysis of the controlling statute, Section

526 of the Tariff Act. The analysis involves an application of the
rules of statutory construction 57 to discover if the applicable portion

52. For a related situation see Vivitar Corp. v. United States, 761 F.2d 1552, 1556 (Fed.
Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1055 (1986). Vivitar was a U.S. corporation which contracted
with a foreign company to manufacture its products. The foreign company did not "use" the
mark, but attached it to the goods at the direction of Vivitir. Vivitar was the parent corporation
to many subsidiaries in foreign countries which distributed the goods in their respective
countries. Third parties purchased the goods and imported them into America where they
competed with Vivitar on the U.S. market. (Because these goods were originally intended to
be imported into the United States by the U.S. trademark owner, and the unauthorized
importation takes place "parallel" to the intended importation, this situation is sometimes
known as "parallel importation") Vivitar had sought a declaratory judgment that the Customs
Service was required to exclude all gray market imports. The court held that the Customs
Service was not required to exclude all gray market goods sua sponte and that the Customs
Service Regulations were not invalid for failing to require such an exclusion. Id. at 1569-70.
53. Plaintiffs at the trial court level of K Mart were parents or licensors of foreign
companies whose goods were ultimately sold to third parties who imported the goods into the
United States. COPIAT v. United States, 598 F.Supp. 844, 846 (D.D.C. 1984).
54. "Parallel importation" is often used synonymously with the term "gray-market
importation." Gray market goods are necessarily imported parallel to goods of the American
trademark owner in Cases 1 and 2. In Case 3, there may not be, strictly speaking, parallel
importation, because the gray market imported goods may be competing with the U.S.
trademark owner's American manufactured goods. "Diverted goods" is another phrase used
to describe this situation. See supra note 2.
55. K Mart, 108 S.Ct. at 1815.
56. K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc.,
-U.S-,
108 S.Ct. 1811, 1815 (1988).
57. Statutory construction is defined as "[a] judicial function required when a statute is
invoked and different interpretations are in contention." BLAciC's LAW DicTroNARY 1266 (5th
ed. 1979). Unless otherwise indicated, this author will treat the terms "statutory construction"
and "statutory interpretation" interchangeably.
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of the Customs Service Regulations is within the scope of the statute.
The Customs Service Regulations include provisions that correspond
to two of the three case scenarios described above.58 While plaintiffs
in K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc. are primarily concerned with Case
2, a judicial interpretation of the controlling law compels an opinion
addressing all the situations in which the gray market arises.
C.

The Controlling Statute and Implementing Regulations
1. Section 526 of the Tariff Act of 1930

The Genuine Goods Exclusion Act as codified in Section 526 of
the Tariff Act, provides that "it shall be unlawful to import into
the United States any merchandise of foreign manufacture if such
merchandise ...

bears a trade-mark owned by a citizen of ...

the

United States and registered in the Patent Office . . . unless written
consent of the owner of such trade-mark is produced at the time of
making entry." 9 The United States Congress enacted Section 526 of
the Tariff Act as a direct response to the holding in A. Bourjois v.
Katzel by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, that a trademark
°
owner could not prevent the importation of gray market goods.
Shortly after the enactment of Section 526, the United States Supreme
Court, aligning case law with Section 526, reversed the appellate
court's decision in A. Bourlois v. Katzel.61
On its face, Section 526 appears to expressly prohibit the importation of all gray market goods without the consent of the American
trademark owner. 62 However, certain portions of Section 526, specifically the phrases "owned by" and "merchandise of foreign manufacture," are susceptible to differing interpretations. 63 The potential
ambiguities in these phrases are important in determining whether
the Customs Service Regulations designed to implement Section 526
are within its scope.

58. Case 2 corresponds with Customs Service Regulation § 133.21(c)(1) and (2) (i.e. the
common control exception).-See text infra accompanying notes 66-69. Case 3 corresponds with
§ 133.21(c)(3), (i.e. the authorized use exception). See text infra accompanying notes 70-72.
59. Tariff Act of 1930 § 526, codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1526 (1982).
60. A. Bourjois v. Katzel, 275 F. 539, 543 (2nd Cir. 1921), rev'd, 260 U.S. 689 (1923).
61. Katzel, 260 U.S. at 692.
62. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
63. A discussion of the possible interpretations is contained in the Case Analysis section,
see infra notes 183-203, 207-14 and accompanying text.
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2. The Customs Service Regulations: Section 133.21
In 1972 the Customs Service adopted Section 133.21, a regulation
that appears to reduce the broad coverage of Section 526 of the
Tariff Act. 4 The regulation provides for two exceptions to the
general
65
goods.
market
gray
of
importation
the
against
prohibition
(a)

The Common Control Exception: Subsections 133.21(c)(1) &

(2)66

Initially, Section 133.21(b) of the Customs Service Regulations
restates the proscription of Section 526 against the importation of

gray goods. 67 However, under Section 133.21(c), exceptions are cre-

ated for situations where: "(1)

[b]oth the foreign and the U.S.

trademark ... are owned by the same person or business entity; (2)
[t]he foreign and domestic trademark ... are parent and subsidiary

companies or are otherwise subject to common ownership or control
.... 68 Subsections (c)(1) and (c)(2) are collectively known as the

"common control" exception. 69 The relationship described in these
Subsections corresponds to the Case 2 scenario described above.
(b) The Authorized-Use Exception: Section 133.21 (c)(3)70

Subsection (c)(3) of Section 133.21 is known as the "authorizeduse" exception. 71 It provides an exception to the importation prohibition of Section 526 when: "(3) The articles of foreign manufacture
bear a recorded trademark .. . applied under authorization of the

U.S. owner." 72 The relationship described under this Subsection
corresponds to the Case 3 situation described above. To discover
whether all of the exceptions contained in these regulations are

64. See Kersner and Stein, supra note 19, at 253. Prior to the promulgation of § 133.21,
the Customs Service had carded out a policy that corresponded to the exceptions contained
in the present regulation. K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 108 S.Ct. at 1828.
65. The exceptions are contained in 19 C.F.R. § 133.21(c)(l)-(3) (1988).
66. 19 C.F.R. § 133.21(c)(1)-(2) (1988).
67. 19 C.F.R. § 133.21(b) (1988). Subsection (b) states: "Identical trademark. Foreignmade articles bearing a trademark identical with one owned and recorded by a citizen of the

United States or a corporation or association created or organized within the United States
are subject to seizure and forfeiture as prohibited importations." Id.
68. 19 C.F.R. § 133.21(c)(l)-(2) (1988).
69. K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc.,
-U.S-,
108 S.Ct. 1811, 1816 (1988).
70. 19 C.F.R. § 133.21(c)(3) (1988).
71. K Mart, 108 S.Ct. at 1816.
72. 19 C.F.R. § 133.21(c)(3) (1988).
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consistent with Section 526 of the Tariff Act, a court must apply

rules of statutory construction.
D.

The Standard of JudicialReview for the Customs Service
Interpretationof Section 526
The first task of a court reviewing the issue of statutory construc-

tion is to determine whether Customs Service Regulations Section
133.21 is "consistent with the language of the statute.

' 73

If Con-

gressional intent is unambiguously expressed in the phrasing of the
statute, the court must give it effect. 74 Arguments that deference
should be given to an agency interpretation, such as the Customs

Service Regulations Section 133.21, will not be considered if Con75
gressional intent is clearly expressed in the controlling statute.

The standard courts apply to ascertain Congressional intent is often
known as the "plain meaning" test. 76 A court looks to the statutory
73. K Mart, 108 S.Ct. at 1817, citing Board of Governors, FRS v. Dimension Financial
Corp., 474 U.S. 361, 368 (1986); Chevron USA Inc. v. Natural Resource Defence Council,
Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-843 (1984); and Mills Music, Inc. v. Snyder, 469 U.S. 153, 164 (1985).
For a discussion of the differing judicial philosophies of the authors of the three opinions in
K Mart with respect to statutory construction, see J.C. Kelso, The Supreme Court's 1987-88
Term: Implicationsfor the TransnationalPractitioner,1 TRANSNAT'L LAw. 391, (1988).
The three opinions in KMart thus give us a good picture of three different approaches
to statutory interpretation: (a) Kennedy subscribes to a strong version of the plainmeaning rule in which legislative history is not relevant ("at least in the first
instance"); (b) Brennan (joined by Marshall, Stevens and probably White) uses the
plain meaning as a starting point for analysis, but will usually resort to extrinsic
materials in a search for congressional intent; and (c) Scalia (joined by Rehnquist,
Blackmun and O'Connor) begins with the plain meaning, but, if the plain meaning
is contrary to the interpretation offered by the government's lawyers or by the
agency, will attach significant weight to that interpretation, even if it is contrary to
the plain meaning.
Id. See also R.R. Kelso and C.K. Kelso, Appeals in Federal Courts by Prosecuting Entities
Other Than the United States: The Plain Meaning Rule Revisited, 33 HASTINGs L.J. 187 (1981)
(Discussing various approaches to statutory interpretation.); Palmeter, supra note 19, at 9192.
If Justice Kennedy's views may be characterized as a strict reading of a statute in
order to give the agency charged with its enforcement wide deference, and if Justice
Brennan's views may be characterized as sustaining an agency practice because it
conforms to what appears to him to be congressional policy sensibly interpreted,
Justice Scalia's views may be characterized as resonating to a theory of legislative
Supremacy. Justice Scalia takes time to dispute Justice Brennan as to the legislative
history of Section 526, but his argument really is on the 'plain words' of the statute.
He scorns Justice Brennan's emphasis on the statute's 'purpose.' Id.
74. K Mart, 108 S.Ct. at 1817, citing Board of Governors, FRS v. Dimension Financial
Corp., 474 U.S. 361, 368 (1986) (quoting Chevron USA Inc. v. Natural Resources Defence
Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-843 (1984)).
75. K Mart, 108 S.Ct. at 1817. See also Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. F.C.C., 395 U.S.
367, 381-82 (1969).
76. K Mart, 108 S.Ct. at 1817. See infra text accompanying notes 136-138, discussing the
approaches toward statutory construction used by the U.S. Supreme Court in determining the
validity of Customs Service Regulation § 133.21(c)(1)-(3).
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language at issue, along with the design of the entire statute to find

its plain meaning.77 When congressional intent is not readily discernable other traditional methods of statutory construction may be

used. 78 If the regulation addresses an issue towards which the statute
is silent or ambiguous, the court must decide whether the regulation
is a "permissible construction of the statute. ' 79 Deference to the
agency interpretation of the statute must be given if the regulation
does not conflict with the plain language of the statute. 80

Circuit Courts, applying these rules of statutory construction in
other gray market cases, have arrived at different conclusions with
respect to the challenged regulations. 8 The United States Supreme
Court granted certiorari in K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc. to resolve
82
the disagreement among the Courts of Appeal.

II.

THE CASE OF K MART CoRP. v. CARTMR, INC.

The long-lived litigation of K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc.83 came
to an end with the Supreme Court decision of May 31, 1988. 4 The
primary issues raised at the different levels of the case center around
jurisdiction and statutory interpretation of Section 526. These issues

77. KMart, 108 S.Ct. at 1817, citing Bethesda Hospital Assn. v. Bowen, 485 U.S.-,
108 S.Ct. 1255 (1988) and Offshore Logistics, Inc. v. Tallentire, 477 U.S. 207, 220-221 (1986).
78. K Mart, 108 S.Ct. at 1822 citing I.N.S. v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 446, (1987)
(The court considered a longstanding agency interpretation as an indication of the legislative
intent).
79. K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc.,
-U.S-,
108 S.Ct. 1811, 1817 (1988), citing
Chevron v. Natural Resources Defence Council, 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984) and Chemical
Manufacturers Assn. v. Natural Resources Defence Council, Inc., 470 U.S. 116, 125 (1985).
80. K Mart, 108 S.Ct. at 1817, citing United States v. Boyle, 469 U.S. 241, 246 n.4,

(1985).
81. Compare Vivitar Corp. v. United States, 761 F.2d 1552, 1557-1560 (Fed. Cir. 1985)
aff'g 593 F.Supp. 420 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1984) cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1055 (1986) and Olympus
Corp. v. United States, 792 F.2d 315, 317-319, (2nd Cir. 1986), aff'g 627 F.Supp. 911
(E.D.N.Y. 1985) cert. denied -U.S-,
108 S.Ct. 2033, with Coalition to Preserve the
Integrity of American Trademarks (COPIAT) v. United States, 598 F.Supp. 844 (D.D.C. 1984)
rev'd 790 F.2d 903 (D.C.Cir. 1986).
82. K Mart, 108 S.Ct. at 1817.
83. Coalition to Preserve the Integrity of American Trademarks (COPIAT) v. United
States, 598 F.Supp. 844 (D. D.C.1984), rev'd 790 F.2d 903 (D.C. Cir. 1986), jurisdiction aff'd
sub nom. K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc.
-U.S-,
108 S.Ct 950 (March 7, 1988); aff'd
in part and rev'd in part .
U.S-. , 108 S.Ct. 1811 (May 31, 1988). At the District Court
and Court of Appeals levels, the case was named Coalition to Preserve the Integrity of
American Trademarks v. United States. K Mart Corp. intervened on the side of the United
States. Cartier Inc. is a member of COPIAT that sued individually.
84. Plaintiffs, Coalition to Preserve the Integrity of American Trademarks (COPIAT),
brought suit on December 5, 1984 in the U.S. District Court, District of Columbia, and
litigation was concluded in the Supreme Court some three and a half years later on May 31,
1988.
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will be the focus in the following discussion of K Mart Corp. v.

Cartier,Inc.
The Supreme Court considered in greater detail than the lower
courts the varying circumstances in which the gray market situation
could arise.85 The Court also scrutinized the language of the Customs
Service Regulations 6 to a greater degree. The Justices considered

separately the "authorized-use" and "common control" exceptions
embodied in the Customs Service Regulations, arriving at opposite

conclusions with respect to the validity of each.8 7 Affirming the Court
of Appeals decision in part, the court struck down the "authorized-

use" exception, codified under 19 C.F.R. Section 133.21(c)(3), finding

it inconsistent with Section 526 of the Tariff Act.88 Reversing the
Court of Appeals in part, the Supreme Court declared valid the

"common control" portion of the regulation, codified under 19
C.F.R. 133.21(c)(l)and (2).89
A.

The Parties
The Plaintiffs are an association of American manufacturing and

distributing companies, The Coalition to Preserve the Integrity of
American Trademarks (COPIAT), and two of its members. 9° Each
of the members owns a trademark registered in the United States. 91

-. U.S-. , 108 S.Ct. 1811, 1814-5 (1988).
85. K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc.,
86. 19 C.F.R. § 133.21(c)(1)-(3) (1988).
87. K Mart, 108 S.Ct. at 1819.
88. Id. at 1817.
89. Id. at 1819.
90. The two members of COPIAT who are also parties in their own right are: Cartier,
Inc., and Charles of the Ritz Group, Ltd., Coalition to Preserve the Integrity of American
Trademarks (COPIAT) v. United States, 790 F.2d 903, 904 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
91. COPIAT, 598 F.Supp. 844, 846 (1984); See also Brief for Respondents, supra note I
at addendum lOa-lla, (The Plaintiffs are The Coalition to Preserve the Integrity of American
Trademarks, and two of its members: Cartier, Inc. and Charles of the Ritz Group, Ltd.) (The
other members of COPIAT are: AC & R Advertising Inc.; Alfin Fragrances, Inc.; American
Cyanamid Company/Jacqueline Cochran; American Watch Association; Auto-Time; Avon
Products, Inc.; Baccarat, Inc.; Brown & Company, Inc.; Calvin Klein Cosmetics Corp.; Canon
U.S.A., Inc.; Citizen Watch Company of America, Inc.; Colonia, Inc.; Compar, Inc.;
Computer Retail Trade Association; Cosmair, Inc.; Dennis Time Co.; Dial Corporation/
Greyhound Corp.; Diodon, Inc.; Distilled Spirits Council of the U.S., Inc.; Duracell Inc.;
Electronic Industries Association/Consumer Electronics Group, E. Leitz, Inc.; Elizabeth Arden,
Inc.; Estee Lauder, Inc.; Giorgio, Inc.; Perfume Division, G-K-G Inc.; G.M.I. Photographic
Inc.; Halston Fragrances, Inc.; Joseph E. Seagrams & Sons, Inc.; Maier & Berkele; Mimco;
Minolta Corporation; Moet-Hennessy U.S. Corp.; National Association of Beverage Importers,
Inc.; Nikon Inc.; North American Watch Corp.; NETCO; Omichron Corp.; P. Robertet, Inc.;
Parfums Givenchy, Inc.; Parfums Stem, Inc.; Parfums Worth Corp.; Pentax Corporation;
PepsiCo; PFW, Division of Hercules, Inc.; Photographic Manufacturers and Distributors
Assoc., Inc.; Photographic Trade News; Polaris Optics; Proctor & Gamble Company; Revlon,
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The trademarked products COPIAT members manufacture or dis-

tribute include fragrances and cosmetics, watches, tires, fine crystal,
cameras, photographic equipment, binoculars, and electronic goods. 92

The trademark owners allege that they suffer damages as a result of
the importation into the United States of gray market goods bearing
the same trademark as their own products. 9
The defendants are the Secretary of the Treasury, 94 the Commissioner of the United States Customs Service, 95 and the United States

of America. 96 Plaintiffs sued the Government and its agencies in their
capacity as the parties responsible for the execution and implemen-

tation of federal trademark and customs laws which are alleged to
be misinterpreted in the agency regulations. 97

K Mart Corporation and 47th Street Photo are intervenors whose
interests are aligned with defendants in supporting the challenged
regulations. 98 Both K Mart and 47th Street Photo are retailers which
sell gray market goods" and benefit from the continued legality of

their importation."00
1. Plaintiffs' Causes of Action

Plaintiffs brought suit for declaratory and injunctive relief in the
United States District Court, District of Columbia. 01' They sought a

Inc.; Richardson-Vicks, Inc.; Schneider Corp. of America; Seiko Time Corporation/Hattori

Corporation of America; Sinar Bron, Inc.; Sony Corporation of America; Stanhill Enterprises,
Inc.; Tessler & Co.; Texchron, Inc.; The Wilkes Group Inc.; Tokina Optical Corp.; Victor
Hasselblad Inc.; Warner Cosmetics Inc.; Well Ceramics & Glass, Inc.; and Whitbread North
America, Inc.).
92. COPIAT, 598 F.Supp. at 846.
93. Id.
94. James A. Baker, III, former Secretary of the Treasury.
95. William von Raab, former Commissioner of Customs.
96. Coalition to Preserve the Integrity of American Trademarks (COPIAT), 598 F.Supp.
844, 846 (D.D.C. 1984).
97. Gorelick and Little, supra note 26, at 216. "The Customs Service ...is the executive
agency charged with the administration of section 526." Id.
98. The name of the case changed from COPIAT v. United States at the trial court and
appellate levels to K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc. in the United States Supreme Court "to
reflect the fact that K Mart was the first party to file for a writ of certiorari" in the United
States Supreme Court. Steele, supra note 1, at 1067, n.7.
99. COPIAT, 598 F.Supp. at 846-47.
100. The interest of these two parties in the matter is evidenced by their involvement as
intervenors in other important gray market cases: Olympus Corp. v. United States, 792 F.2d
315 (2d Cir. 1986) (both K Mart and 47th Street Photo); Vivitar Corp. v. United States, 585
F.Supp. 1415 (Fed.Cir. 1985) (47th Street Photo only) In the Matter of Certain Alkaline
Batteries, 6 I.T.R.D. (BNA) 1849 (K Mart only).
101. Coalition to Preserve the Integrity of American Trademarks (COPIAT) v. United
States, 598 F.Supp. 844, 844 (D.D.C. 1984).
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mandatory order from the Court directing the United States Customs
Service to exclude gray market goods from importation into the
United States. 10 2 Plaintiffs alleged that they were being denied the
trademark protection provided by the Tariff Act Section 526103 and
the Lanham Trademark Act Section 42104 by the enforcement of
inconsistent Customs Service Regulations. 105 A challenge to the facial
validity of the Customs Service Regulations is the substance of this
suit. Plaintiffs requested the court to declare the regulations inconsistent with the Acts, to enjoin the continued enforcement of the
regulations, and to order the enforcement of the Acts by their express

terms. 106
2. Defendants' and Intervenors' Arguments
Defendants initially challenged the lawsuit on jurisdictional grounds,
alleging that the Court of International Trade has exclusive jurisdiction over claims under Section 526 of the Tariff Act. 1°7 It was also
asserted that plaintiffs failed to state a claim under Section 42 of
the Lanham Act l0 8 upon which relief could be granted.' °9 Defendants
and intervenors argued that the Customs Service Regulations are a
valid interpretation of applicable trademark statutes and that gray
market importation is beneficial to consumers.110
B.

Issues
1. Jurisdiction

The United States District Court for the District of Columbia
disagreed with the decision of Vivitar Corp. v. United States,"'
holding that claims arising under Section 526 of the Tariff Act were

102. COPIAT, 598 F.Supp. at 846.
103. Tariff Act of 1930, 19 U.S.C. §1526 (1982).
104. Lanham Trademark Act, § 42, 15 U.S.C. § 1124 (1982).
105. COPIAT, 598 F.Supp. at 846.
106. Coalition to Preserve the Integrity of American Trademarks (COPIAT) v. United
States, 598 F.Supp. 844, 846 (D.D.C. 1984).
107. COPIAT, 598 F.Supp. at 847.
108. Id.
109. FED.R.CIv.P. 12(b)(6).
110. COPIAT, 598 F.Supp. at 850-851.
111. Vivitar Corp. v. United States, 585 F.Supp. 1415 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1984), aff'd, 761
F.2d 1552 (1985) (Holding that the Court of International Trade possessed exclusive jurisdiction
over claims arising under §526 of the Tariff Act because 28 U.S.C. §1581(a)(i)(3) grants that
court exclusive jurisdiction over international trade disputes.) Id. at 1555.
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within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of International Trade.
The District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the

lower court's ruling that jurisdiction was not exclusive to the Court

of International Trade."' The Supreme Court subsequently affirmed
the holding that the jurisdiction of the CIT is not exclusive" 4 and
that the District Court has jurisdiction pursuant to the general
"federal-question" provision" 5 and6 provisions arising under Acts of
Congress relating to trademarks."
2.

17
Lanham Act Claim1

The plaintiffs brought a cause of action based on Section 42 of
112. Id.
113. Coalition to Preserve the Integrity of American Trademarks (COPIAT) v. United
States, 790 F.2d 903, 906 (D.C.Cir. 1986).
-,
108 S.Ct. 950, 960 (1988). (After this
.U.S
114. K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc.,
jurisdictional decision the case was restored to the calendar for reargument on the merits).
115. The general federal-question provision is codified under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, which
states: "The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the
Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States."
116. 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (Actions arising under statutes relating to trademarks)
"Patents, plant variety protection, copyrights, trade-marks, and unfair competition.
(a) The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action arising under any
Act of Congress relating to... trade-marks ......
117. 15 U.S.C. § 1051 et seq. (1982). Plaintiffs in gray market cases, including those in K
Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc. frequently invoke provisions of the Trade Mark Act of 1946
(known as the Lanham Act) to challenge the legality of gray market importation. The Lanham
Act contains provisions for registration of trademarks and the rights and remedies available
to trademark owners. Section 42 of the Lanham Act addresses protection against trademark
infringement. Section 42 provides that "no article of imported merchandise... which shall
copy or simulate a trademark registered in accordance with the provisions of this chapter...
shall be admitted to entry at any custom house of the United States." (15 U.S.C. § 1124).
Parties have invoked the Lanham Act in spite of its literal language because of the early
gray market case, A. Bourjois & Co. v. Katzel, 275 F. 539 (2d Cir. 1921). In that case the
Second Circuit Court of Appeals held American trademark owners could not use trademark
law to prevent gray market imports (Katzel, 275 F. at 543). Both Congress and the United
States Supreme Court disagreed with the Second Circuit's holding. The Supreme Court based
its decision to exclude the gray goods on Section 27 of the Trade Mark Act of 1905, the
equivalent of today's Section 42 (Katzel, 260 U.S. at 691). Federal District Courts have
distinguished the reliance of the Supreme Court in Katzel on Section 27, stating that the
decision was based on equitable considerations rather than on the literal language of the
Trademark Act (see Gorelick and Little, supra note 26, at 225). See supra text accompanying
notes 67-68 (referring to A. Bourjois & Co. v. Katze.
Opponents of the gray market attempt to invoke the protection of the Lanham Act because
the alleged injury suffered by competition from gray market goods is arguably analogous to
that suffered from counterfeit goods. However, gray market goods, by definition, bear "valid
U.S. trademarks." (K Mart, 108 S.Ct. at 1814). Since Section 42 only addresses copied or
simulated marks, gray market goods are not within the reach of the Lanham Act (COPIAT,
598 F.Supp. at 848). Federal District Courts have usually dismissed Section 42 causes of action
in the gray market context (COPIAT, 598 F.Supp. at 848, Olympus, 627 F.Supp. at 917,
NEC, 810 F.2d at 1510, Prestonettes, Inc. v. Coty, 264 U.S. 359, 368-9 (1924)). Although a
Section 42 cause of action was pled at the trial court stage of K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc.,
it was dismissed for the reasons stated above and was not addressed by the U.S. Supreme
Court (see COPIAT, 598 F.Supp. at 848).

1989 / K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc.
the Lanham Act.118 However, defendants' motion to dismiss for
failure to state a cause of action under the Lanham Act was granted." 9
The District Court found that, absent certain limited circumstances,12 0
Section 42 of the Lanham Act applies exclusively to items bearing
counterfeit trademarks or trademarks that copy or simulate genuine
trademarks.' 2 ' The District Court stated that since Plaintiffs' trademarks at issue in the case are authentic, the Lanham Act does not
apply.122 Neither the Appellate Court nor the Supreme Court addressed the issue concerning the applicability of the Lanham Act.'2
3.

Statutory Construction24

(a) District Court
The primary issue of K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc. concerns
whether Customs Service Regulations allowing importation of certain
gray market goods are consistent with the Tariff Act they are designed
to implement. 25 The District Court found the Customs Service Re26
gulations to be consistent with the Tariff Act and therefore valid.
The court stated that "the task for a court is not to interpret a
statute as it thinks best, but rather the narrower inquiry into whether
the agency's construction is 'sufficiently reasonable' to be accepted
by the reviewing court."' 127 The court further stated that "in order

118. COPIAT, 598 F.Supp. at 847.
119. Coalition to Preserve the Integrity of American Trademarks (COPIAT) v. United
States, 598 F.Supp. 844, 848 (D.D.C. 1984).
120. Id. at 848, referring to A. Bourjois v. Katzel, 275 F. 539 (2d. Cir. 1921), rev'd 260
U.S. 689 (1923). The Katzel court held that § 42 of the Lanham Act allowed the gray-market
victim in that case to prevent the importation of goods by a third party (the case I situation).
121. COPIAT, 598 F.Supp. at 848.
122. Id.
123. See Coalition to Preserve the Integrity of American Trademarks (COPIAT) v. United
States, 790 F.2d 903, 907 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (Because the District of Columbia Circuit Court
of Appeals held that the regulations are not consistent with Section 526, the court did not
find it necessary to decide whether the regulations would be consistent with Section 42 of the
Lanham Act. See also K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 108 S.Ct. 1811, 1817 n.3 (1988). The
Court stated, "Respondents... asserted that the Customs Service regulation was inconsistent
with § 42 of the Lanham Trade-Mark Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1124, which prohibits the importation
of goods bearing marks that 'copy or simulate' U.S. trademarks. That issue is not before us."
Id. (emphasis added).
124. See supra notes 73-82 and accompanying text.
125. K Mart, 108 S.Ct. at 1814.
126. Coalition to Preserve the Integrity of American Trademarks (COPIAT) v. United
States, 598 F.Supp. 844, 852 (D.D.C. 1984).
127. COPIAT, 598 F.Supp. at 851, citing, Federal Election Commission v. Democratic
Senatorial Campaign, 454 U.S. 27, 39, (1981) (citing Zenith Radio Corporation v. United
States, 437 U.S. 443, 450 (1978) and Train v. Natural Resources Defence Council, 421 U.S.
60, 75 (1975)).

The TransnationalLawyer / Vol. 2
to satisfy this standard, it is not necessary for a court to find that
the agency's construction is the only reasonable one or even the
reading the court would have reached' if the question had initially
arisen in a judicial proceeding."' 28 The district court held that the
Customs Service made a "sufficiently reasonable" interpretation of
129
the statute, thus satisfying the proper standard of review.
(b)

U.S. Court of Appeals

The Court of Appeals rejected the District Court's finding that
the Customs Service interpretation of Section 526 through its Regulations was "sufficiently reasonable."' 130 Contrary to the lower court,
it found that the Customs Service interpretation of the Regulations
did not display the necessary "thoroughness, validity, and consistency
to merit judicial acceptance."' 3 The court also noted that, throughout
the history of Section 133.21, poor reasoning has been offered in its
defense. 32 It found, scant support in the legislative history for the
Customs Service interpretation. 3 3 The Court of Appeals held that
the Customs Service Regulations were invalid because they did not
constitute a reasonable interpretation of Section 526.114
The appellate judges found the Congressional intent clear with
respect to Section 526 of the Tariff Act. 3 Under their interpretation
the plaintiff/appellants' situation fit within the literal language of
the statute and was protected by its provisions. 36 The Court stated
that it could not be compelled to "choose between the 'plain meaning'
of a statute and extrinsic indicia of intent: . . . the circumstances
prompting the enactment of Section 526 and its legislative history
persuade us that the statute embodies a purpose as sweeping as the
terms its drafters employed." 37

128. COPIAT, 598 F.Supp. at 851.
129. Id. at 852. In upholding the Customs Service Regulations the District Court stated
that the Customs Service interpretation of Section 526 was consistent with the Congressional
intent behind that statute. "This construction is supported by the legislative history, judicial
decisions, legislative acquiescence, and the long-standing consistent policy of the Customs
Service." Id.
130. COPIAT, 790 F.2d at 916.
131. Coalition to Preserve the Integrity of American Trademarks (COPIAT) v. United
States, 790 F.2d 903, 916 (D.C. Cir. 1986) citing Federal Election Comm'n v. Democratic
Senatorial Campaign Comm., 454 U.S. 27, 37 (1981).
132. COPIAT, 790 F.2d at 916.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 908.
135. Id.
136. Coalition to Preserve the Integrity of American Trademarks (COPIAT) v. United
States, 790 F.2d 903, 908 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
137. Id. The Court of Appeals looked to legislative history of the statute and contempo-
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The Court of Appeals held that a literal interpretation of Section
526 was supported by the purpose of the law as expressed by members
of Congress.' An extensive review of the Senate debate reinforced
the Appellate Court's conclusion that Section 526 of the Tariff Act
confers an "absolute, unqualified property right upon American
companies that own registered trademarks."' 39 A proposed amendment to Section 526 that did not become law indicated that Congress
understood Section 526 to bar the importation of goods bearing an
4
American company's trademark unless that company consented.'
The Senate passed this amendment which was later rejected by the
House of Representatives. 41 The Appellate Court reasoned that unless
the Senate interpreted Section 526 to bar importation without the
owner's consent, the amendment they had passed would have been
"wholly ineffectual and purposeless."' 42 The court concluded that
Congress "in 1930-those favoring and opposing the amendmentbelieved that Section 526 applied to all situations literally within its
43
terms."
Therefore, the appellate court reversed the judgment of the District
Court and remanded the case back to the District Court with orders
to issue a declaratory judgment that the Customs Service Regulations
44
were inconsistent with Section 526 and therefore unlawful.
(c)
-

The Supreme Court 45
Justice Kennedy'"

A majority of six Justices agreed that the standard for review of
agency regulations interpreting a federal statute should be the "plain

raneous interpretations of the Customs Service regulation throughout the years of its existence
to arrive at the conclusion that the regulation was contrary to Section 526 of the Tariff Act

and "hence unlawful." Id. at 918.
138.

Id. at 910.

139. Id.
140. Id. at 912-13. The proposed amendment would have caused the deletion of the clause
that permitted the United States trademark owner to consent to the importation of goods

bearing its trademark. Thus the amendment would have made the exclusion of gray market
goods mandatory instead of discretionary. The amendment was intended to "protect American
jobs by preventing U.S. based manufacturers from establishing foreign based plants." Id. at

912. The House rejected the amendment and it was abandoned in conference. "The failed
amendment further demonstrates Congress' understanding that § 526 absolutely barred impor-

tation of goods bearing an American company's trademark without the company's consent."
Id. at 912-913, referring to 72 Cong. Rec. 7870 (1930).

141. 72 Cong. Rec. 7870 (1930).
142. Coalition to Preserve the Integrity of American Trademarks (COPIAT), 790 F.2d 903,
913 (D.C. Cir. 1986).

143. Id. at 913.
144. Id. at 918.
145.

The three Supreme Court opinions approached the issue of statutory construction

323
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meaning" test as articulated by Justice Kennedy.

47

The majority held

that "[i]f the statute in question is silent or ambiguous with respect
to the specific issue" in question, the court must decide whether the
construction of the statute by the agency is a permissible one. 4 If
there is no conflict between the plain language of the statute and the
agency's regulation, "the court must give deference to the agency's

interpretation of the statute.'

'149

Justice Kennedy's standard of review does not analyze the legislative history of Section 526 nor the statute's purpose. 15 0 In contrast,
Justice Brennan scrutinized the legislative history and subsequent
developments to attempt to overcome the ambiguities inherent in the

statute. The differences in judicial philosophy of each Justice is
evident at this initial stage of analysis and ultimately influences their

conclusions. 151
-

Justice Scalia

Justice Scalia and those who joined in his opinion concurred with
Justice Kennedy in regard to the standard of review. 52 However, one
commentator has noted that, although both opinions give a strict
reading to the statute, they have a different emphasis.

53

Justice Scalia

states that there is only one instance in which the court should
disregard the "plain application of the statute" and focus on its

legislative purpose.

54

That instance occurs when a change in circum-

stances with respect to the subject matter of the statute is evident.

differently. Justice Kennedy was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justices Blackmun,
O'Connor, and Scalia. K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 108 S.Ct. 1811, 1814 and 1817 (1988).
Justice Scalia authored his own opinion and was joined by the Chief Justice, Justices Blackmun,
and O'Connor. Id. at 1931, 1834-35. The dissent on the issue of statutory construction was
authored by Justice Brennan who was joined by Justices Marshall and Stevens. Id. at 1819,
1920-22. Justice White did not join any opinion on the issue of statutory construction.
146. Justice Kennedy authored the plurality opinion. K Mart, 108 S.Ct. at 1814.
147. Id. at 1817. Justice Kennedy states that, "[i]n ascertaining the plain meaning of the
statute, the court must look to the particular statutory language at issue, as well as the
language and design of the statute as a whole;" citing Bethesda Hospital Assn. v. Bowen, 108
S.Ct. 1255 (1988); and Offshore Logistics, Inc. v. Tallentire, 106 S.Ct. 2485, 2493-94 (1986).
148. K Mart, 108 S.Ct. at 1817.
149. Id., citing United States v. Boyle, 469 U.S. 241, 246 (1985).
150. K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc.,
-U.S-,
108 S.Ct. 1811, 1817 (1988). Justice
Kennedy states: "[A]ny reference to legislative history ... is in the first instance irrelevant."
Id. at 1818, n.4.
151. See supra note 73.
152. Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice Blackmun, and Justice O'Connor joined with Justice
Scalia on the issue of statutory interpretation; K Mart, 108 S.Ct. at 1831.
153. Palmeter, supra note 19, at 91-92. See also supra note 62.
154. K Mart, 108 S.Ct. at 1835.
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"It [must be] clear that the alleged changed circumstances 55 were
unknown to, and unenvisioned by, the enacting legislature, and it
[must be] clear that they cause the challenged application of the
statute to exceed its original purpose."'' - 6 Justice Scalia asserted that7
with respect to Section 526 neither of these conditions are satisfied.1
Thus, he concludes that the rules of statutory interpretation only
carved
allow for a literal reading of Section 526, and the 5exceptions
8
upheld.
be
not
should
Service
out by the Customs
Justice Brennan'59
Justice Brennan takes a far different approach to the method of
statutory construction.6° He considers the practical effects of the
3
statute, 6 the Congressional intent, 62 and the equities involved, 6 as
well as what weight should be given to a "longstanding agency
interpretation."164
To determine the reasonableness of the Customs Service interpretation of Section 526, Justice Brennan begins with the proposition
6
that the particular statutory language at issue must be examined, 1
-

155. Justice Scalia asserts that, "the prerogative of each currently elected Congress [is] to
allow those laws which change has rendered nugatory to die an unobserved death if it no
longer thinks their purposes worthwhile; and to allow those laws whose effects have been
expanded by change to remain alive if it favors the new effects." K Mart Corp. v. Cartier,
Inc., 108 S.Ct. 1811, 1834 (1988). By the term "changed circumstances" Justice Scalia is
referring to a change of circumstances that would render the Congressional purpose of the
statute inapplicable.
156. K Mart, 108 S.Ct. at 1835.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. On the issue of statutory construction, Justice Brennan, joined by Justices Marshall
and Stevens, dissents. See id. at 1821-22.
160. See Palmeter, supra note 19, at 91-92.
161.

K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc.,

-U.S-,

108 S.Ct. 1811, 1819 (1988).

162. Id. at 1823-27.
163. Id.at 1823, 1830.
164. Id. at 1827-8; citing Zenith Radio Corp. v. United States, 437 U.S. 443, 450 (1978);
and NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 275, (1974); K Mart, 108 S.Ct. at 1822,
citing INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421 (1987). The weight to be given longstanding
agency interpretation is one of the main points at which the judicial philosophies of the various
Justices' clash. Justice Kennedy interprets the Act without resort to the Customs Service's past
practices, solely looking to the statutory language itself. See supra note 73.
165. It is at this point that Justices Kennedy and especially Scalia end their analyses, relying
solely on the language of the statute. See Palmeter supra note 19, at 91-92 and supra note
80. Justice Brennan seems to express his disapproval of Scalia's and Kennedy's approach by
stating that when the haste of Congress in enacting 526 is taken into account, there is reason
to "avoid a hypertechnical interpretation that would 'make trouble rather than allay it."' K
Mart at 1823, citing Fort Smith & Western R. Co. v. Mills, 253 U.S. 206, 208 (1920); and
United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 344 (1971); Justice Brennan also seems to be announcing
his disapproval of the other Justices' philosophy by quoting: "To hold otherwise is to wrench
statutory words out of their legislative context and treat legislation as no more than a 'collection
of English words' rather than 'a working instrument of government ......."K Mart, 108 S.Ct.
at 1829-30, citing United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277, 280 (1943).
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along with the "language and design of the statute as a whole.' ' 66
To discover the design of the statute, he states that it must be
understood in the context out of which it was created, 67 which
includes the factual basis of A. Bourjois & Co. v. Katzel. 61 In a
remarkably different posture from the approach of Justices Kennedy
and Scalia, Justice Brennan cites a "familiar rule" that, even if the
language of Section 526 clearly indicated its coverage, "a thing may
be within the letter of the statute and yet not within the statute,
69
because not within its spirit, nor within the intention of its makers."'1
Justice Brennan's analysis begins with an examination of the
language of the statute to show its protectionist nature.1 70 He reasons
that, since protectionism is the purpose of the statute, Congress could
not intend that foreign manufacturers should be able to circumvent
this intent by establishing a domestic subsidiary for the purpose of
"owning" the United States trademark (a Case 2a scenario). 7' Justice
Brennan suggests that much of the language of the statute would be
pointless if foreign corporations could so easily get around the
172
purpose of an Act intended for the benefit of American companies.
After a discussion of the Senate Debates and Conference Reports,
Justice Brennan arrives at the conclusion that the evidence clearly
shows that the only goal Congress had in enacting Section 526 was
to overrule Katzel on its facts.'7 Thus Congress was intending to
exclude from the statute's protection trademark owners affiliated
74
with foreign manufacturers (i.e., all Case 2 variations).
Finally, Brennan is in favor of giving deference to the longstanding
agency interpretation of the statute. 75 He supports the proposition
that since ambiguities exist in Section 526, the Customs Service

166. K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc.,
-U.S-,
108 S.Ct. 1811, 1820 (1988).
167. Id. at 1822.
168. A. Bourjois & Co. v. Katzel, 275 F. 539, (2nd Cir. 1921), rev'd 260 U.S. 689 (1923).
169. K Mart, 108 S.Ct. at 1821-22; citing Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 201 (1979)
(quoting Holy Trinity Church v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 459 (1892)).
170. K Mart, 108 S.Ct, at 1820.
171. K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., .. U.S-,
108 S.Ct. 1811, 1821 (1988). Justice
Brennan states that the barriers to importation embodied in § 526 "are fragile barriers indeed

if a foreign manufacturer might bypass them by the simple device of incorporating a shell
domestic subsidiary and transferring to it a single asset-the U.S. trademark. Such a reading

of § 526 seems entirely at odds with the protectionist sentiment that inspired the provision."
Id
172.
173.
174.
175.
(1978);

Id. at 1821.
Id. at 1824.
Id. at 1826.
Id. at 1827-1828, citing: Zenith Radio Corp. v. United States, 437 U.S. 443, 450
NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 275 (1974).
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interpretation should be accepted, at the very least, if it is a reasonable one.1 76 Additionally, he considers the effect on the domestic
retail industry which has developed in reliance on this longstanding
77
Customs Service interpretation.
4. Application of the Rules of Statutory Construction
Upon final review the United States Supreme Court strikes a
balance between the holdings of the District Court and the Court of
Appeals in K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc.7 8 By a narrow margin of
five to four the Supreme Court upholds the "common control"
exception 79 of the Customs Service Regulations.8 0 This interpretation
of the relevant law allows for the continued importation of most
gray market goods (Case 2). By an equally narrow margin, the Court
struck down the "authorized-use" exception of the Regulations. 8 '
Thus, gray market goods falling within the "authorized-use" scenario
(Case 3) are excluded under Section 526 of the Tariff Act as directed
in Customs Service Regulations Section 133.21(b).
(a) The Common Control Exception8 2
-

Justice Kennedy

Justice Kennedy, joined by Justice White, holds that the phrase
"owned by" contained in Section 526 of the Tariff Act is "ambiguous."' 8 3 The ambiguity that Justice Kennedy perceives lies in the
difficulty of determining who the "owner" of the United States
trademark is when a foreign parent company establishes a subsidiary
in the U.S. to register the trademark of the foreign parent with the

176. K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 108 S.Ct. 1811, 1826-27 (1988).
177. Id. at 1828, citing Zenith Radio Corp. v. United States, 437 U.S. 443, 457 (1978).
178. Coalition to Preserve the Integrity of American Trademarks (COPIAT) v. United
States, 598 F.Supp. 844, 846 (D. D.C.1984), rev'd 790 F.2d 903 (D.C. Cir. 1986), jurisdiction
aff'd sub noma.K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc.
-U.S-.,
108 S.Ct 950 (March 7, 1988),
aff'd in part and rev'd in part -U.S-,
108 S.Ct. 1811 (May 31, 1988).
179. 19 C.F.R. § 133.21(c)(1) and (2) (1988).
180. K Mart, 108 S.Ct. at 1814.
181. 19 C.F.R. § 133.21(c)(3) (1988).
182. 19 C.F.R. § 133.21(c)(1)-(2) (1988). See supra text accompanying notes 66-69.
183. K Mart, 108 S.Ct. at 1818. Section 526 states that ". . .it shall be unlawful to import
into the United States any merchandise of foreign manufacture if such merchandise,., . bears
a trademark owned by a citizen of... the United States, and registered in the Patent
Office.... ." 19 U.S.C. § 1526 (1982) (emphasis added). Justices Brennan, Marshall, and
Stevens agreed with the result of allowing this part of the regulation to stand, but followed
entirely different reasoning in arriving at this conclusion. See also sources cited supra note 80.
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United States Patent Office (Case 2a).184 The phrase "owned by"
can be interpreted to mean that the foreign parent is the "owner"
or that the domestic subsidiary is the "owner." Since Justice Kennedy
found the phrase "owned by" to be ambiguous, it was held that the
Customs Service is entitled to make a "reasonable" interpretation of
18 5
the phrase under its own Regulations.
To uphold the Case 2b and 2c scenarios within the "common
control" exception of the Customs Service Regulations, Justice Kennedy found an additional ambiguity in the phrase "merchandise of
foreign manufacture" in Section 526.186 He points out that this
ambiguity parallels that of the "owned by" ambiguity, "which
sustained [the] Case 2a [scenario].' ' 1 7 He notes that the phrase
"merchandise of foreign manufacture" could cover, not only goods
manufactured on foreign soil by a foreign company, but also goods
manufactured in the U.S. by a foreign company or, even goods
manufactured in a foreign country by an American company. 8 Thus,
in further support of upholding the "common control" exception,
Kennedy held that it was not unreasonable for the Customs Service
to interpret the ambiguous phrase "merchandise of foreign manufacture" to mean that goods manufactured by a foreign subsidiary'8 9
or division'" of a domestic company are not "goods of foreign
manufacture.'" 191
-

Justice Brennan

Justice Brennan also upholds the "common control" exception
embodied in the Customs Service Regulations. 192 In defining the
"ownership" qualification in the language of the Tariff Act, Brennan's view is that the foreign parent company approximates the true

184.
185.
186.

K Mart, 108 S.Ct. at 1818.
Id.
K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., ..

526 states that ".

.

U.S-,

108 S.Ct. 1811, 1818 (1988). Section

.it shall be unlawful to import into the United States any merchandise of

foreign manufacture if such merchandise,.. . bears a trademark owned by a citizen of... the
United States, and registered in the Patent Office.. ." 19 U.S.C. § 1526 (1982) (emphasis
added).
187. K Mart, 108 S.Ct. at 1818.
188. Id.
189. Recall that when the American trademark owner has a foreign subsidiary which is
the source of the gray market goods, this a Case 2b scenario. See supra text accompanying
notes 51-54.
190. Recall that when the American trademark owner has a foreign manufacturing division
which is the source of the gray market goods, this a Case 2c scenario.
191. K Mart, 108 S.Ct. at 1818.
192. Id. at 1820.
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"owner" more accurately than does its American subsidiary (in the
Case 2a scenario). 19 Thus, because of the ambiguity present in this
language of the statute, Brennan agrees with Justice Kennedy that
the Customs Service is free to give the phrase "owned by" its own
reasonable interpretation. 94
Justice Brennan's conclusion rests on the premise that, due to a
change in circumstances, the original purpose behind Section 526 is
too narrow to afford the trademark owner (in all three case scenarios)
the full intended statutory protection. 195 He states that the legislature
which promulgated Section 526 of the Tariff Act did not contemplate
that a trademark owner might license or "assign the rights to use its
trademark, along with business and goodwill, to an unrelated manufacturer in another territory.' '1 96 Justice Brennan further asserts that
if the legislature could have contemplated such a change in the view
of trademark ownership, they would have "almost certainly ...
concluded that such a transaction would divest the licensor not only
of the benefit of Section 526's importation prohibition, but of all
trademark protection."' 97 Thus, he concludes that the "common
control" exception must be upheld in order to afford trademark
owners the protection of Section 526 to "assign rights in a particular
territory along with goodwill, [while] retaining ownership in another
distinct territory."' 198
Furthermore, Justice Brennan would uphold the "common control" exception because of the ambiguity in the phrase "merchandise
of foreign manufacture.' " 99 He stated that the "phrase could readily
be interpreted to mean either 'merchandise manufactured in a foreign
country' or 'merchandise manufactured by a foreigner. ' ' ' 200 He asserts
that under the former interpretation, "the merchandise manufactured
20 1
abroad in cases 2b and 2c would fall within [Section] 526's ban."
"Under the latter definition . .. the coverage is not as clear.''202 If

193. Id. at 1821. In support of this proposition, Justice Brennan cites Cf.Copperweld
Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 771 (1984). A parent and a wholly owned
subsidiary "always have a unity of purpose or a common design." Id.(emphasis in original).
108 S.Ct. 1811, 1821 (1988).
194. K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., -U.S-,
195. Id. at 1829.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Id., citing California Wine & Liquor Corp. v. William Zakon & Sons, Inc., 297 Mass.
373, 378, 8 N.E.2d 812, 814 (1937).
199. K Mart, 108 S.Ct. at 1821.
108 S.Ct. 1811, 1821 (1988).
200. K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., .U.S-,
201. Id.
202. Id.
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"merchandise manufactured by a foreigner" is the criterion, Brennan
would not deem a manufacturing division or a subsidiary of an
American firm abroad "in any sense a foreigner. ' 20 3 Multinational
companies based in the United States would be greatly affected
depending on which interpretation is applied. 204 The combined votes
of the Justices supporting the opinions of Justice Kennedy and Justice
Brennan has the effect of upholding the validity of the "common
control" exception of the Customs Service Regulations. Consequently, the Customs Service, in enforcing its regulations, is free to
prohibit American companies "owned by" a foreign entity from
invoking the protection of Section 526.205
-

Justice Scalia

Justice Scalia, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices
Blackmun and O'Connor, asserts that the "common control" excep-tion of the Customs Service Regulations is in "conflict with the clear
language of Section 526(a). '" 206 He agrees with the rest of the Court
in finding that the phrase "owned by" in Section 526 of the Tariff
Act "is ambiguous when applied to domestic subsidiaries of foreign
corporations (Case 2a).'"207 However, Justice Scalia disagrees as to
the significance of this ambiguity with respect to the discretion of
the Customs Service in interpreting Section 526.208 He states that
"the authority to clarify an ambiguity in a statute is not the [same
as the] authority to alter ... its unambiguous applications, and
Section 526 unambiguously encompasses most of the situations that
' 20 9
the regulation purports to exclude.
The "common control" exception of the Customs Service
Regulations2 0 allows the importation of gray goods "bearing a
domestic trademark that have been manufactured abroad by the
trademark owner (Case 2c), or by the trademark owner's subsidiary
(Case 2b)." 211 In other words, such goods would not be subject to

203. Id.
204. See supra text accompanying notes 257-262.
205. K Mart, 108 S.Ct. at 1820.
206. Id. at 1831.
207. K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc.,
.U.S
, 108 S.Ct. 1811, 1831 (1988).
208. Id.
209. Id. In expressing his disagreement with Brennan's examination of the purposes of the
statute articulated at the time of its enactment, Justice Scalia states that the reach of the
statute should not be limited to the purposes contemplated at the time of its enactment, but
goes beyond "to cover the same inequity in other contexts." Id. at 1836.
210. 19 C.F.R. § 133(c)(1) & (2) (1988).
211. KMart, 108 S.Ct. at 1831.
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the import prohibitions of Section 526.212 Scalia asserts that no matter
how one interprets the relationship between a parent corporation and
its subsidiary with respect to ownership of their assets, it would be
"impossible to conclude that

...

anyone other than [the] United

21 3
States corporation" owns the trademark applied to their products.
However, since "the statutory requirement that the trademark be
'owned by' a U.S. citizen or corporation is unambiguous with respect
to these two cases," Justice Scalia would not uphold the "common
control" exception of Section 133.21(c)(1) & (2) of the Customs
21 4
Service Regulations.

(b) The Authorized-Use Exception215
-

Justice Kennedy

A united majority of five Justices concurred in the opinion of
Justice Kennedy agreeing that the "authorized-use" exception of the
Customs Service Regulations should be struck down as inconsistent
with Section 526 of the Tariff Act. 216 They hold that there is a direct
conflict between the plain language of the Act and Section 133.21(c)(3)
of the Regulations. 2 7 Due to this direct conflict, the Court maintains
that the ambiguities in the phrases "owned by" and "of foreign
manufacture" in Section 526 are irrelevant to the analysis of the
"authorized-use" exception. 218 Were the court to allow the "authorized-use" exception to stand, a domestic trademark holder would
have the power to prevent the importation of "goods made by an
independent foreign manufacturer where the domestic trademark
holder has authorized the foreign manufacturer to use the trademark. ' 21 9 Justice Kennedy states that no reasonable construction of
Section 526 could exclude such goods from its scope. 220 Without any
further discussion, the "authorized-use" subsection of the regulation
was declared invalid.2 1

212.
213.
214.
215.
216.

Id.
K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc.,
-U.S-,
108 S.Ct. 1811, 1831 (1988).
Id.
19 C.F.R. 133.21(c)(3) (1988). See supra text accompanying notes 70-72.
K Mart, 108 S.Ct. at 1817, Opinion of Justice Kennedy joined by Chief Justice

Rehnquist, and Justices Blackmun, O'Connor and Scalia. Id. at 1814.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.

Id. at 1819.
K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc.,
Id.
Id. at 1818-19.
Id. at 1819.

.U.S-,

108 S.Ct. 1811, 1818 (1988).
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-

Justice Brennan

Justice Brennan, along with three others,m expressed belief that
the "authorized-use" exception of Section 133.21(c)(3) is a reasonable
interpretation of Section 526 of the Tariff Act. 23 He finds ambiguity
in the application of Section 526 to a situation in which an American
firm authorizes the use of its trademark to an independent foreign
firm (Case 3).224 Justice Brennan states that comprehension of the
ambiguity in Section 526 "follows only from an understanding of
trademark law that established itself long after the 1922 enactment
'
and 1930 re-enactment of Section 526. 225
The rights that a trademark owner was entitled to at the time of
enactment of Section 526 are different from what a trademark owner
is entitled to today. 2 6 "When [Section] 526 was before Congress [in
1922], the prevailing law held that a trademark's sole purpose was
'227
to identify for consumers the product's physical source or origin.
Under today's views, a trademark is also to serve the function of
"identifying product quality for consumers." 228 "[I]t was not until
well after [Section] 526's enactment that it became clear that a
trademark owner could assign rights in a particular territory along
with goodwill, while retaining ownership in another distinct territory. "229 Brennan states that, since the legislators who enacted Section
526 could not have contemplated such an expansion of trademark
law, the Customs Service is free to interpret the statute in any way
that is reasonable. 0 Thus, Justice Brennan concludes that the Customs Service interpretation of Section 526 was reasonable in excluding
American companies who authorized the use of their trademark to

222. Id. (Joining Justice Brennan are Justices Marshall, Stevens and White).
223. K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc.,
.U.S
, 108 S.Ct. 1811, 1831 (1988).
224. Id. at 1830.
225. Id. at 1828.
226. Id. at 1829.
227. Id. at 1828, referring to Macmahan Pharmacal Co. v. Denver Chem. Mfg. Co., 113
F. 468, 475 (8th Cir. 1901). "Under this early 'source theory' of protection, trademark licensing
was viewed as philosophically impossible, since licensing meant that the mark was being used
by persons not associated with the real manufacturing 'source' in a strict, physical sense of
the word." Id. at 1828, citing 1 J. McCARThY, TRADEMARKs AND UNFAiR ComIETrTION, §
18:13 at 826 (2d ed. 1984) (hereinafter McCARTHY).
228. K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., .U.....S
, 108 S.Ct. 1811, 1829 (1988) citing 1
McCARTHsr, at 827-829.
229. K Mart, 108 S.Ct. at 1829, referring to California Wine & Liquor Corp. v. William
Zakon & Sons, Inc., 297 Mass. 373, 378; 8 N.E.2d 812, 814 (1937).
230. K Mart, 108 S.Ct. at 1821, "The language of §133.21(c)) can reasonably be read...
as the Customs Service has [interpreted it]. .. ".
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a foreign manufacturer (Case 3) from the protection of Section 526.23 1
The holder of the United States trademark in Case 3 does not need
the protection of Section 526 because that company can avoid competition from the imported gray goods by declining to license the use
of its mark abroad.:2
III.

LEGAL RAMIFICATIONS

The plurality of KMart Corp. v. Cartier,Inc. upheld the "common
control" exception embodied in the Customs Service Regulations and
found the "authorized-use" exception of those Regulations to be an
unreasonable interpretation of Section 526.2 3 In so doing, the U.S.
Supreme Court left intact a major inroad for gray market goods
entering the United States by upholding the "common control"
exception, within which the Case 2 scenario falls. Since the reach of
Section 526 does not extend to prohibit the importation of all gray
market goods, it is necessary to address the potential effect on the
international business community and the continuing problems behind
the gray market. The remainder of this note will expand on the issues
raised in other areas of the law as well as issues that the Court failed
to consider.
A.

Effects on the Gray Market After K Mart Corp. v. Cartier,
Inc.

The authors of the three opinions in K Mart Corp. v. Cartier,
Inc. avoided addressing the full effects that the plurality holding has
on the various gray market scenarios, concentrating instead on strict
application of principles of statutory interpretation. The Court's
approach may stem from a recognition that the decision to permit
or prohibit gray market importation properly belongs to the other
branches of the government. To address the problems associated with
the gray market, the Legislative and Executive branches can adopt a
position somewhere between absolutely banning gray market imports
or allowing free importation of gray goods. It is more likely, however,
that any legislative or administrative reaction will occupy an intermediate position between these polar options. In selecting this posi-

231. Id. at 1831.
232. Id. at 1830. Justice Brennan states that "the holder of the U.S. trademark in case 3
can avoid competition simply by declining to license its use abroad or even (if contractually
permitted) revoking an already-issued license." Id.
233. K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., ..
U.S-,
108 S.Ct. 1811, 1819 (1988).
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tion, the Legislative and Executive branches must resolve many
complex political and economic policy decisions. 2 4 The remaining
portions of this note will consider the impact of K Mart Corp. v.
CartierInc. on the various gray market case scenarios and the effect
of the Court's holding on the international business, with an eye
towards identifying the factors likely to be influential upon any
policy decisions made by the Administration or Congress.
1. Issues Under Case One: "The Prototypical Gray Market
VictimI"
The "prototypical" gray market victim is the "domestic firm that
purchases from an independent foreign firm the rights to register
and use the [foreign firm's] trademark as a U.S. trademark and to
sell its foreign-manufactured products... [in the United States].''231
This is represented by the Case 1 gray market scenario. 236 The owner
of the 'new' domestic trademark contemplates that it will be an
exclusive distributor of those trademarked goods in the United States
with the ability to exclude unwanted competition. 237 However, if the
foreign manufacturer of the goods (or a third party) imports and
distributes goods bearing the same trademark, the American firm
will be subjected to unexpected intrabrand competition. 2 8 The American firm will lose the market advantage that it acquired by purchasing the rights to register and use the independent foreign entity's
trademark. 2 9 To alleviate this perceived unfairness in the Case 1
scenario Congress enacted Section 526 of the Tariff Act.20 Therefore,
the Supreme Court in K Mart Corp. v. CartierInc. had no difficulty
in unanimously agreeing that the Customs Service is within the law
when it bars importation in Case 1.24

234. Palmeter, supra note 19, at 42.
235. K Mart, 108 S.Ct. at 1814, 1820. See A. Bourjois v. Katzel, 275 F. 539 (2d Cir.
1921), rev'd 260 U.S. 689 (1923).
236. K Mart, 108 S.Ct. at 1820.
237. See K Mart, 108 S.Ct. at 1822-23.
238. See generally A. Bourjois & Co. v. Katzel, 275 F. 539 (2nd Cir. 1921).
239. K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc.,
U.........,
108 S.Ct. 1811, 1822-23 (1988). Brennan

states that "the U.S. trademark holder that . . . has purchased trademark rights at arms's
length from an independent [foreign] manufacturer stands to lose the full benefit of its bargain
because of gray-market interference." Id.
240. Id. at 1815. Justice Kennedy states that "In an immediate response to Katzel, Congress
enacted § 526 of the Tariff Act. . ."; see A. Bourjois & Co. v. Katzel, 275 F. 539 (2d Cir.
1921), rev'd 260 U.S. 689 (1923).
241. K Mart, 108 S.Ct. at 1815, 1820 (J. Brennan concurring).
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Section 526 affords to certain American trademark owners a great
deal of power to shield themselves from foreign intrabrand competition.22 By invoking the rights granted in Section 526, the United
States markholder of the Case 1 category can have the Customs
Service prevent the importation of all goods bearing its trademark.24 3
Consequently, for the prototypical Case 1 victim, the United States
Supreme Court in K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc. has reaffirmed the
American trademark owner's monopoly for distribution of trademarked goods in the United States.24
Justices Brennan and Scalia briefly allude to the international
ramifications of the powerful exclusionary rights afforded to American companies under Section 526.2 5 Justice Brennan remarks upon
the protectionist impetus behind the enactment of Section 526, stating
that "[tihe barriers that Congress erected seem calculated to serve
no purpose other than to reserve exclusively to domestic, not foreign,
interests the extraordinary protection that [Section] 526 provides.'"'2
Justice Scalia points out that the holding in K Mart Corp. v. Cartier,
Inc. requires the Customs Service to discover the corporate identity
of an importer of gray goods to determine whether the goods are
"of foreign manufacture," as interpreted by the majority to include
"goods manufactured by foreigners."247 The holding in K Mart Corp.
v. Cartier,Inc. interprets the Customs Service Regulations as treating
goods manufactured by American companies in a foreign country
more favorably than goods manufactured in the same foreign country
by companies owned by parties in that country.2 8 This is because
goods manufactured by an American company in country "B" can
be imported into the United States unhindered by a possibility of
exclusion under Section 526. However, goods manufactured in country "B" by a company of country "B" will be subject to exclusion
under Section 526, for example, if the goods bear a trademark the
use of which was authorized by an American company. Under these
circumstances the goods from country "B" may be excluded because

.U.S ., 108 S.Ct. 1811, 1819 (1988).
242. K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc.,
243. 19 U.S.C. § 1526(a). Remedies available under (b) and (c) include "seizure and
forfeiture" of the offending merchandise, as well as injunctive relief and monetary damages.

244. K Mart, 108 S.Ct. at 1819. See infra text accompanying notes 303-339. (Section
addressing antitrust issues).
245. K Mart, 108 S.Ct. at 1820 (Brennan J., concurring in part and dissenting in part);

Id.at 1833 (Scalia J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
246.
247.
248.

Id. at 1820-21.
Id. at 1833.
K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc.,

.U.S.

, 108 S.Ct. 1811, 1833 (1988).
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the authorized-use exception was invalidated under K Mart Corp. v.
Cartier, Inc. If the American company was authorized to use a
trademark originally belonging to a foreigner (Case 1), the American
company will similarly be able to request the Customs Service to
exclude gray market goods. This apparent discrimination against
foreign owned companies is likely to conflict with terms in commercial treaties the United States has entered into with other nations.2 9
Justice Scalia cited as an example of such a conflict the Treaty of
Friendship, Commerce and Navigation with the Federal Republic of
Germany 2 0 (Treaty of Friendship) which contains a "national treatment" clause.25' "National treatment" is defined as the obligation
of a state to accord "to the nationals of another state treatment
equivalent to that which the state accords to its own nationals.' '252
The Treaty of Friendship expressly provides: "Nationals and companies of either Party shall be accorded national treatment and mostfavored-nation treatment by the other Party with respect to all matters
relating to importation and exportation." ' 3 As stated above, an
American company operating on foreign soil may freely import its
trademarked goods into the United States without threat of exclusion,
while a foreign licensee of the trademark manufacturing on foreign
soil may face a bar to importation due to Section 526. If such an
importation bar occurs, the foreign licensee may have a complaint
based on a violation of the treaty provisions. National treatment
questions may also arise when a foreign-based multinational enterprise (MNE) establishes a subsidiary in the United States for the
purpose of registering its trademark in the United States. If the
subsidiary is viewed as an American company 2 4 there would naturally
be no national treatment problem. However, if the subsidiary is
viewed as "foreign" because of its relationship to the MNE, then it
may have a complaint under the treaty provision if it is treated

249. Id.
250. Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation with the Federal Republic of Germany, October 29, 1954, [1956] United States-Federal Republic of Germany, art. XIV, para.
2, 7 U.S.T. 1839, 1843, T.I.A.S. No. 3593 [hereinafter Treaty of Friendship].
251. Treaty of Friendship, 7 U.S.T., at 1855, art. XIV, para. 4. The treaty provides that
"[n]ationals and companies of either Party shall be accorded national treatment and mostfavored-nation treatment by the other Party with respect to all matters relating to importation
and exportation." Id.
252. RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, TENTATIVE DRAFT
No. 4, § 801(2), (1983).
253. Treaty of Friendship at 1855, art. XIV, para. 4.
254. See infra text accompanying note 275.
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differently than an "American" company with regards to rights
under Section 526.
A "national treatment" clause is present in other international
agreements to which the United States is a party in addition to the
Treaty of Friendship. Notable examples include the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)25 and the Paris Convention for
the Protection of Industrial Property.2 6 While GATT and the Treaty
of Friendship directly address national treatment with respect to
importation, the national treatment clause of the Paris Convention
is focused upon intellectual property rights. 2 7 The compatibility of
this type of treaty with the operation of Section 526 of the Tariff
Act depends upon whether the rights provided under that Act are
viewed as "intellectual property" rights25 , as opposed to merely
"importation" rights. After all, Section 526 is not located within the
Lanham Act, which governs trademark rights in the United States,
but rather within the Tariff Act. The potential discriminatory nature
of Section 526 derives from the fact that it was created to protect
United States citizens exclusively.2 9 On the other hand, the Lanham
Act, in establishing trademark law in the United States, is not
designed to protect only American citizens. 26°
However, Section 526 operates to bar trademarked goods unless
consent to their importation is given by the American trademark

255. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, art. III, 55 U.N.T.S. 194,
206, T.I.A.S. 1700 [hereinafter GATI]. "Such discriminatory treatment is likely to result in
complaints about the U.S. legislation in GATT." Remington, Comments on K Mart v. Cartier:
Gray Market Trade and EEC Law, 22 J. WonLD TRADE 93, 101. [hereinafter Remington].
256. Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, July 14, 1967, art. 2,
para. 1, 21 U.S.T. 1630, 1631, T.I.A.S. No. 6923 [hereinafter Paris Convention].
257. Paris Convention at 1631. Art. 2, paragraphs I and 2, provide:
(1) Nationals of any country of the Union shall, as regards the protection of
industrial property, enjoy in all the other countries of the Union the advantages that
their respective laws now grant, or may hereinafter grant, to nationals ....
Consequently, they shall have the same protection as the latter, and the same legal remedy
against any infringement of their rights, provided that the conditions and formalities
imposed upon nationals are complied with.
(2) However, no requirement as to domicile or establishment in the country where
the protection is claimed may be imposed upon nationals of countries of the Union
for the enjoyment of any industrial property right.
Id.
258. The Paris Convention uses the phrase "industrial property" to encompass "patents,....
industrial designs, trademarks, service marks ..
" Paris Convention, art. 1, para. 2. For ease
of reference in this portion of the Note, these rights are referred to as "intellectual property"
rights.
259. See text of the Tariff Act, 19 U.S.C. § 1526, and K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., U.S_, 108 S.Ct. 1811, 1819 (1988).
260. See 15 U.S.C. § 1051, which contains no nationality requirements for trademark
registration.
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owner. 26' The right to enforcement of Section 526 is likely to be
viewed as a trademark (or intellectual property) right that may only
be enjoyed by American citizens. Thus, treaties pertaining to trademarks may entitle foreign owners to every trademark right afforded
to American mark owners under the Lanham Act, yet the treaties
may neglect to afford the foreign owners the "trademark right"
contained in Section 526. This unequal treatment may violate the
national treatment clauses of those treaties.
An additional troublesome issue arises in considering the relative
weight to be given a treaty ratified by Congress and an act adopted
by Congress. In other words, the issue is whether the Treaty of
Friendship or the Tariff Act controls when some of their terms
conflict. Both treaties and federal statutes are considered "the supreme law of the land. 22 As the two are equal, case law states that
courts will always construe them so as to give effect to both, but if
they are inconsistent, the most recent expression of the sovereign will
controls. 263 However, a treaty "will not be deemed to have been
abrogated or modified by a later statute unless such purpose on the
' 264
part of Congress has been clearly expressed."
The Tariff Act is the most recent expression of the sovereign will
of the United States Government in relation to the Treaty of Friendship with the Federal Republic of Germany, the Treaty of Paris, and
GATT. 265 It is doubtful, however, that Congress intended to abrogate
the "national treatment" clauses within those treaties. Therefore,
Section 526 of the Tariff Act may very well stand in conflict with
the "more recent expressions of sovereign will" embodied in the
national treatment clauses of those treaties.
2. Issues Under Case Two: "The Common Control Exception"
As mentioned by Justice Brennan, in the variations under Case 2
there may be an element of direct control between a parent and
subsidiary (or division) located abroad. 266 If this control existed, a

261.
262.
263.
264.

See supra note 14, for the text of Section 526.
NowAx, CONT TrrUoNAL LAW, Section 6.8, at 206.
Id., citing Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190 (1888).
NowAK, supra note 250, at 206, quoting Cook v. United States, 288 U.S. 102, 120

(1933).
265. The Tariff Act was most recently amended in 1975, the Treaty of Friendship with the
Federal Republic of Germany was ratified in 1956; the Paris Treaty in 1967; GATT in 1947.
See supra notes 257, 262, 263.
266. K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 108 S.Ct. 1811, 1823 (1988).
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trademark owner would have internal methods to prevent the parallel
importation by its affiliate and perhaps by a third party. 267 Presum-

ably, because the parent company has control over the subsidiary, it
can prevent gray market importation by responding

"with a panoply of options that are unavailable to the independent
purchaser of a foreign trademark. [The parent and subsidiary]
could, for example, jointly decide in their mutual best interests
that the manufacturer (1) should not import directly to any domestic purchaser other than its affiliate; (2) should, if legal, impose
a restriction against resale (or against resale in the United States)
as a condition on its sales abroad to potential parallel importers;
' 268
or (3) should curtail sales abroad entirely.

Under this analysis, it is reasonable to assume that Congress could
have intended the different treatment afforded in Section 526 to
Multinational Enterprises (MNEs, which are Case 2 companies) as
opposed to companies that do not have transnational affiliations.
The Customs Service Regulations will not extend the protections of
Section 526 to "common control" companies because those companies have a self-policing capability which allows them to prevent the
importation of gray goods within their relationship structure.
However, this presents a rather incomplete view of MNEs. It is
not always correct to assume that, as between a number of affiliated
firms in different countries, there is one parent that controls the
operation of all its foreign subsidiaries. 269 The MNE can be understood in two ways. First, in the traditional view, the parent and
subsidiary are considered separate and distinct legal entities. All
transactions between the two firms are viewed as made at arms
length. If this view were followed a subsidiary with a registered
trademark in the United States is an American owner and citizen
entitled to all the rights that status provides. In a second view, the
MNE is considered as a "network of operations, services, or a global
multiplant system connected through a common resource pool and a
common strategy with all its component parts." 270 The structure may

267.
268.
269.
holding

Id.
Id.
Compare Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 771 (1984),
that a parent and wholly owned subsidiary are one entity for purposes of antitrust

law. But note that this does not address the situation in which the ownership or control
between the entities is less than complete.
270. Yelpaala, In Search of Effective Policies for Foreign Direct Investment: Alternatives
to Tax Incentive Policies, 7 Nw. J. INr'L L. & Bus. 208, 215 (1985) [hereinafter Yelpaala].
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be polycentric rather than monocentric in nature. 271 A polycentric
structure could make it impossible for an American company to
command a foreign affiliate to take measures to prevent gray marketeers from obtaining goods bearing its trademark for importation
into the United States. Similarly, common ownership will not always
mean common control to the extent assumed by Justice Brennan in
the analysis immediately above.
Whether or not MNEs have a monocentric control structure, their
complex nature makes them difficult to reconcile with the intended
scope of Section 526. Recall that Section 526 was intended to protect
only American interests. 272 The language of the statute proscribes the
importation of foreign manufactured merchandise "if such merchandise . . . bears a trade-mark owned by a citizen of, or by a corporation or association created or organized within, the United States
.... "273 (emphasis added) The characteristics of MNEs create difficulties in determining whether a company is American or not for
purposes of Section 526. Although American subsidiaries are "organized within the United States," the problem is whether as de jure
owner of the U.S. trademark, the subsidiary, as opposed to a foreign
affiliate within its MNE system (possibly the de facto owner of the
trademark), should be considered the trademark owner under Section
526.274 Under the traditional view described above, the American
subsidiary would be considered the owner of the mark without
dispute. Under the other view described, the question is more difficult
to resolve. According to the second view, "[t]he MNE enjoys tremendous flexibility in its operational decision process. Its decisions
are neither bound nor seriously limited by considerations of ...

regional, national, or cultural allegiances.'

'275

Business entities oper-

ating on such a global perspective do not lend themselves easily to
a characterization of being "foreign" or "domestic." The "nationality" of an MNE could be determined upon such criteria as its
place of incorporation, the citizenship of the majority of its equity

271. Id. at 215. For purposes of this Note "Polycentric" is defined as having many centers
of control, as distinguished from "monocentric" where there is only one center of control.
272. K Mart, 108 S.Ct. at 1820.
273. 19 U.S.C. § 1526 (1982) (emphasis added).
274. The United States Supreme Court has recognized that a parent company and its
wholly owned subsidiary are a single entity for purposes of antitrust law. See supra note 276.
Whether this reasoning could be extended to fields of law such as trademark ownership, and
how it effects a relationship of less than complete ownership of the subsidiary by the parent,
has not been decided.
275. Yelpaala, supra note 270, at 214.
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owners, the citizenship of the majority of its officers, the location
of its headquarters or majority of its offices, or even the locations
of its primary manufacturing plants or the largest market it supplies.
Perhaps none of these criteria would successfully determine whether
a company is American or not for purposes of Section 526.
The statutory distinctions of Section 526 are also difficult to define
when determining which entity of a MNE "owns" the trademark
registered in the United States. The question becomes whether an
American company which is part of a MNE is really "American"
for purposes of Section 526, when it is a member of an MNE which
may be primarily owned by foreign interests or partially controlled
by a non-American company. As discussed above, the flexible structure of MNE organization may render the question unanswerable.
The solution to trademark ownership suggested by the United States
Patent and Trademark Office, and noted by Justice Brennan in K
Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc. may be the wisest when dealing with
MNEs. 276 The position taken is that trademark ownership among
parent and subsidiary corporations "is largely a matter to be decided
between the parties themselves. ' 277 While this allows the MNE members to decide for themselves how best to take advantage of differences in trademark laws in various countries, it takes the burden
away from the Customs Service of having to determine the nationality
of MNE members.
As a result of the holding in K Mart Corp. v. Cartier,Inc., goods
produced abroad under an "authorized-use" arrangement (Case 3)
may now be barred by the Customs Service from importation into
the United States pursuant to Section 526. Goods manufactured
within foreign borders pursuant to a Case 1 relationship are also
susceptible to exclusion under Section 526. Goods produced by an
affiliated firm under common control with an American company
(Case 2) will be allowed entry into the United States by the Customs
Service by operation of the common control exception. However,
one of the questions the United States Supreme Court did not answer
in K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc. was whether a plaintiff within a
Case 2 scenario who wishes to exclude gray market goods could still
invoke Section 526 in spite of the United States Supreme Court
upholding the validity of the common control exception. This possibility was directly addressed by the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals

276.
277.

K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc. 108 S.Ct. 1811, 1821 (1988).
1 McCRTRY, supra note 216, at 748.

The TransnationalLawyer / VoL 2

in Vivitar Corp. v. United States.278 That court held that the "Customs regulations cannot affect the actual scope of a trademark
owner's rights vis-a-vis an importer under the statute. ' '279 "Regardless
of whether Customs excludes or does not exclude particular imports,
the courts must independently determine whether the importation is
or is not precluded by the statute.''280 The Vivitar court held that a
trademark owner is entitled to "pursue private remedies against the
importer, and, if successful, to have such grey market goods excluded." '28' In contrast, the language of some of the K Mart opinions
seem to imply that the Customs Service Regulations are the sole
recourse for an American trademark owner to exclude gray market
goods. For example, Justice Brennan writes, "[t]he Customs Service's
common-control exception denudes the trademark holder of [Section]
526's protection in each of the [common control] cases. "282 Justice
Scalia also appears to be under the assumption that, if goods are
not excluded under the Customs Service Regulations, there is no
other remedy for the American trademark owner. He states that "the
majority's suggested interpretation [of Section 526] ...

would have

the effect of eliminating [Section] 526's protection for some trademark holders in case 1..

."I

On the other hand, in a separate

opinion addressing the jurisdictional issues in K Mart Corp. v.
Cartier, Inc., Justice Brennan wrote that the Customs Service regulation at issue is a "mechanism by which a private party might, at
its own option, enlist the Government's aid in restricting the quantity
of imports in order to enforce a private right.'284 This statement
suggests a recognition that a private party may choose an alternative
option to the Customs Service regulation in enforcing its private
right. Such an alternative may be for the American trademark owner
to obtain an injunction under Section 526 ordering the Customs
Service to exclude gray market goods when the remedy provided by
the Customs Service Regulations is inadequate to provide such relief. 285
278.

Vivitar Corp. v. United States, 761 F.2d 1552 (Fed. Cir. 1985) cert. denied, 474 U.S.

1055 (1986).
279.
280.
281.
282.
283.
284.
285.

Id., 761 F.2d at 1569.
Id.
Id.
K Mart, 108 S.Ct. at 1820.
Id. at 1832.
K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., -..... U.S-,
108 S.Ct. 950, 957 (1988).
The Customs Service Regulations, as a Government Agency's rules, do not have the

force of law. Thus the requirement that to obtain equitable relief one must show an inadequate
remedy at law does not apply to the Customs Service Regulations, which are not a remedy at
law. See Vivitar Corp. v. United States, 761 F.2d 1552, 1569 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
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The issue decided by the Supreme Court in K Mart Corp. v.
Cartier, Inc. was the narrow one of whether the Customs Service
Regulation was a permissible construction of Section 526. In order
to decide this issue, the court had to construe the scope of Section
526. However, to decide that issue it was not necessary to determine
the entire range of Section 526's applications beyond the Customs
Service Regulations. If this is true, any language in the case indicating
that the Customs Service Regulations are the sole remedy available
to trademark owners under 526 may be dicta. Certainly, the case did
6
not expressly overrule the holding of Vivitar.2
If the Vivitar holding remains viable after K Mart Corp. v. Cartier,
Inc., the result for MNEs may be that they may still obtain the
exclusionary benefits of Section 526. However, the approach taken
by opponents of the common control exception by attacking the
Customs Service Regulations suggests that they recognized the regulations to be a large obstacle. If K Mart Corp. v. Cartier,Inc. does
implicitly overrule the Vivitar holding of an additional approach to
exclude gray goods, then MNE's may have another reason to object
to their treatment under the Customs Service Regulations.
If American companies falling within the "common control" exception are now unable to legally exclude gray market goods to
protect themselves from the intrabrand competition, they may be
encouraged to license unaffiliated manufacturers in foreign countries
when accessing foreign markets and discouraged from establishing
subsidiaries abroad. This could cause those companies to lose the
advantage of economic efficiencies that a foreign location may provide.
In addition to the possible chilling of foreign investment, the
upholding of the "common control" exception, coupled with the
striking down of the "authorized-use" exception, may create other
problems for MNEs. The "common control" exception may discriminate against MNEs by facilitating intrabrand competition from third
party gray market importers. American firms which acquire the right
to register a trademark from an independent foreign company (Case
1) can successfully request that the United States Customs Service
287
block gray market imports under the Customs Service Regulations.

286.

The Vivitar case was cited in the K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc. decision only to

illustrate that the Circuit Courts were in disagreement on the validity of Customs Service
Regulations Section 133.21(c) with respect to Section 526 of the Tariff Act. K Mart, 108 S.Ct.

at 1817.
287.

See infra text accompanying notes 240-41.
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Similarly, the ruling in K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc. by striking
down the "authorized-use" exception, allows domestic firms which
authorize an independent foreign company to use the domestic firm's
trademark abroad (Case 3), to request the Customs Service to exclude
gray market imports.28 After K Mart Corp. v. Cartier,Inc., however,
an American parent or subsidiary that is part of a MNE is foreclosed
from this option (at least with respect to invoking the Customs
Service Regulations) and would be forced to compete against gray
market imports if relief could not otherwise be obtained in a Section
526 action.
A possible result of such discrimination may be to force MNE's
to access American and foreign markets through an independent
distributor. Such a situation could significantly affect international
investment patterns. Domestic and foreign parent companies are
precluded from achieving the same monopoly position in the United
States available to United States trademark owners who are unaffiliated with their foreign distributors. Thus, a foreign trademark owner
considering investment in the United States to form a manufacturing
or distributing subsidiary (or division) might refrain from making
such an investment because gray market importers will reduce his
potential market share.u 9 Conversely, an American parent owning a
U.S. trademark might refrain from establishing subsidiaries abroad
for fear of losing its market position in the United States.
Strict enforcement of the "common control" exception may go as
far as to discourage even minority ownership by American MNEs in
foreign-based operations. The "common control" exception allows
the importation of gray market goods based on the existence of "a
parent-subsidiary relationship or other form of common control. ' '2 9°
If interpreted broadly, this provision might apply to a firm in which
the parent possesses a minority ownership share and yet significantly
influences the management of the foreign distributor.
By discouraging a MNE from exploiting trademark-based monopolies in several countries a policy of decentralization of economic
power could result. The MNE could be compelled to achieve trademark-monopoly profits through licensing or franchising agreements
with independent firms. This precludes establishment of intercon-

288. K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc.,
-U.S-,
108 S.Ct. 1811, 1819 (1988).
289. "Most COPIAT members are wholly-owned, or at least effectively controlled, by the
foreign companies which manufacture the trademarked goods and are largely responsible for
the trademark's goodwill in the United States." Steele, supra note 1, at 1066. Thus, the
members of COPIAT are among those that would complain of this discrimination.
290. 19 C.F.R. § 133.21(c)(2) (1988).
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nected enterprises exploiting different national markets pursuant to
a parent corporation that acts as a centralized decision-making authority. This potential impetus towards decentralization, if realized,
would occur without an express statement from Congress of its
intention to achieve such a result. Clearly, the impact of such an
unintended policy on investment in the United States and other
countries should be included in any comprehensive analysis of the
gray market.
3.

Issues Under Case Three: "The Authorized-Use Exception"

In Case 3, the American company "authorizes" an independent
foreign entity to use its United States trademark. 291 Usually the mark
holder sells the use of the trademark to the foreign manufacturer
and restricts its use to a particular foreign location. 292 Such a restrictive distribution scheme will usually prohibit the foreign manufacturer
from importing the trademarked goods into the United States. 293
Nevertheless, if the foreign manufacturer or a third party imports
the goods into the United States intrabrand competition from the
gray market will result. 294 To avoid this problem the American
trademark holder may now invoke the protection of Section 526 of
the Tariff Act to prohibit the importation of the foreign manufactured goods. Where previously the "authorized use" exception permitted importation of this form of gray goods, the K Mart Corp. v.
Cartier, Inc. decision removes this barrier to exclusion of gray

imports .295
B.

Antitrust Law

As Justice Brennan noted in K Mart Corp. v. CartierInc., Section
296
526 grants "extraordinary protection" to certain trademark owners.

291. K Mart, 108 S.Ct. at 1815.
292. Id. (See OriginalAppalachian Artworks, Inc. v. GranadaElectronics, Inc., 816 F.2d
68 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S.Ct. 143 (1987) (In Granadaa United States corporation
licensed the use of the "CABBAGE PATCH KIDS" trademark to an independent Spanish
entity, restricting its use to a limited area.); see also Note, Original Appalachian Artworks,
Inc. V. GranadaElectronics, Inc.: The Cabbage Patch Doll Goes Gray?, I TRANSNAT'L LAW.

339 (1988).
293. K Mart, 108 S.Ct. at 1815.
294. Id.
295. Because the source of the goods is dispositive and not the party importing them, even
third parties who attempt to import gray goods under the Case 3 type of relationship can be
prevented from doing so after the K Mart holding. A person wishing to engage in parallel
importation will be forced to distinguish between goods manufactured by a Case 1 or 3
company, as opposed to goods manufactured by a Case 2 company.
296. K Mart, 108 S.Ct. at 1819 (Justice Brennan, concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
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The protection provided by Section 526 involves the ability to exclude
potential competition from gray market goods. This exclusion may

facilitate the anticompetitive practices of price discrimination and
market protection. 297 Since the purpose of antitrust law is to promote
competition, 298 such an exclusionary practice brings up antitrust issues. 9 American trademark owners who fall within the Case 1
characterization and invoke Section 526 risk running afoul of the
antitrust laws. After K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., United States
trademark owners who "authorize" the use of their marks to inde-

pendent foreign companies in order to enforce the importation prohibitions of Section 526 run the same risk. Since the Court in K
Mart Corp. v. Cartier,Inc. did not explicitly overrule the holding in
Vivitar Corp. v. United States, even companies falling within the
Case 2 scenarios that wish to invoke the protection of Section 526
run the risk of violating the antitrust laws.
American antitrust law is codified in the Sherman Act. 3°° Section
1 of the Sherman Act (Sherman 1) proscribes "[e]very contract,
combination,.., or conspiracy, in restraint of trade.... "301 An
American trademark holder, in attempting to prevent competition
from gray goods, is not acting in "contract, combination or
conspiracy" 30 2 when he unilaterally attempts to exclude gray market

imports under Section 526. Consequently, a trademark owner will
not be in violation of Sherman 1 unless he acts in concert with a
another for the purpose of restraining trade,3 03 or colludes with an
297. Mackintosh, supra note 1, at 309. The Osawa court suggested that "The promulgation
of the [Customs Service] regulations represented an effort on the part of Customs to implement
its perception of antitrust policy" with respect to the gray market. Osawa & Co. v. B & H
Photo, 589 F.Supp. 1163, 1177 (S.D.N.Y. 1984), referring to Atwood, Import Restrictions on
Trademarked Merchandise-The Role of the United States Bureau of Customs, 59 TRaDEMAK
RaP. 301 (1969).
298. "In passing the antitrust laws 'Congress was dealing with competition, which it sought
to protect, and monopoly, which it sought to prevent."' AREEDA & TuRNER, ANTiTRUsT LAW:
AN ANALYsis op ANTIrRUsT PRiNcr's AND Timm APPLICAnON, 7 (1978) quoting Standard
Oil Co. v. F.T.C., 340 U.S. 231, 249 (1951).
299. See generally Gorelick and Little, supra note 26, at 227-30; Kelly, An Overview of
the Influx of Grey Market Goods Into the United States, 11 N.C.J. INT'L L. & CoM. Ro.
231, 244-48 (1986); Mackintosh, supra note 1, at 309-312; Takamatsu, supra note 26, at 43738.
300. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1982).
301. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982).
302. Id.
303. This is an example of a horizontal restraint of trade. Horizontal arrangements are
defined as agreements among competitors. T. Vh.KEcs, AN-rrrusT BAsics 1-14 (Law Journal
Seminars-Press No. 3, 1987). [hereinafter VAYEcmcs] The United States Supreme Court has
held that a wholly owned subsidiary cannot "conspire" with its parent within the meaning of
the antitrust laws because they are the same entity. Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube
Corp., 467 U.S. 752 (1984).
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independent company on a vertical distribution chain. 3°4 The situations in which an American trademark owner could violate Sherman
1 include: a "horizontal" agreement to attempt to stop gray market
importation into the United States between the American company
which is an exclusive distributor in the United States of the trademarked item and other exclusive distributors in foreign countries; 05
or, a "vertical" agreement between a foreign manufacturer and the
American trademark owner authorizing the use of the mark to the
foreign company in return for which the foreign company will sell
to the American company exclusively in the United States and use
its best efforts to prevent the entry of gray market goods into the
United States 1°0 In both of these situations, the use of Section 526
to exclude gray market goods by the American company is not an
element of an antitrust violation. The violation lies in the agreement
to commit anticompetitive acts, and not in the acts themselves.
An exercise of rights under Section 526 is more likely to give rise
to a Sherman Act Section 2 violation.30 7 "Every person who shall
monopolize, or attempt to monopolize ... trade" is liable under
Section 2 of the Sherman Act (Sherman 2).301 This provision of the
antitrust laws is concerned with unilateral acts, such as the invocation
by one party of Section 526 to protect itself from competition.
Indeed, there is a possibility that Section 526 conflicts with the
Sherman Act. 1 9 At the least, antitrust law provides an affirmative
defense for a gray market importer who is threatened with exclusion
because of a Section 526 action. 310 It must be kept in mind, however,
that a trademark owner has a type of monopoly right inherent in
his mark. A successful invocation of Section 526 excludes only goods
bearing a genuine trademark, not goods that bear a different trademark but are functionally identical and capable of creating competition. Under modem antitrust trends, reduced intrabrand competition

304. This is an example of a vertical restraint of trade. Vertical restraints are defined as
the ability of a manufacturer to control the practices of independent wholesalers and retailers
who resell the products of a manufacturer. VAxRucs, supra note 303, at 7-1. See, Kersten,
Hans-Christian, EEC Antitrust Policy on 'Grey Market' Exports and Imports Within the
Common Market, 16 INT'L Bus. LAW. 134, 139 (March 1988).
305. D. Bender and R. Davis, Gray Market Goods and the Antitrust Laws, in GRAY
MARKETS AND PARALLEL IMPORTS: PROTECTIONISM VS. FREE Ti UDE, PATENTS COPYRIGHTS,
TRADEMARKS AND LITERARY PROPERTY: Course Series Number 217, 303 (1986).

306.

Id.

307.
308.

See id. at 304.
Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1982).

309.
310.

Bender and Davis, supra note 305, at 317.
Id. at 326.
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which would result from the exclusion of goods bearing an identical
trademark is not necessarily viewed as undesirable.3 ' Reduced intrabrand competition may often help to increase interbrand competition.31 2 The argument is that the goals of antitrust law would be
better accomplished by increasing interbrand competition.313 A Sherman 2 violation is only likely to be found under narrow circumstances
where it could be proven that "the overall net effect of excluding
grey market imports would be anticompetitive.

' '31 4

Antitrust claims have been raised in several early gray market
cases, 315 but none appear determinative of the current state of antitrust law as applied to the gray market. In United States v. Guerlain
Inc, 316 U.S. Justice Department attorneys argued that an American
distributor, by invoking Section 526, was in violation of Sherman 2
for an "attempt to monopolize" the importation of trademarked
toilet products. 317 The District Court for the Southern District of
New York held that the exclusion of gray market goods by the
American company "for excluding competition and controlling price
levels [was] a monopolization and an attempt to monopolize . . ."
18 Although
in violation of Sherman 2.1
the government attorneys were
victorious in their claim, they later requested that the case be dismissed on the grounds that the case involved issues that were best
handled by the legislative branch.3 19 This was because government

311. Id. at 306-307. See Continental TV Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 51-55
(1977).
312. Intrabrand competition between trademarked goods refers to competition between
goods bearing the same mark. In contrast, interbrand competition results when goods bearing
different trademarks compete. The existence of interbrand competition prevents price-gouging
by retailers because their competitors will undersell them to attract customers. "The ability of
a firm or group of firms to [practice anticompetitive acts] depends upon their customers'
ability to obtain equivalent products or acceptable substitutes from other suppliers or to forego
the product entirely." AREEDA AND Hov llMIp, ANIRusT LAW: AN ANALYSIs OF ANTITRUST
PmiNCEPLES AND Tiem APPLICATION, 392 (1988 supp.) The trademark owner would not be able

to exploit his trademark monopoly and set his prices higher than the domestic market would
ordinarily bear for his goods because consumers would simply purchase a competitor's
equivalent good.
313. See generally Continental TV Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
314. Bender and Davis, supra note 305, at 326. Stating that the analysis to discover whether
the conduct was anticompetitive would probably be based on the Sylvania case.
315. United States v. Guerlain, Inc., 155 F. Supp. 77 (S.D.N.Y. 1957), prob. jurisd noted
sub nom. Lanvin, Perfumes, Inc. v. United States, 355 U.S. 951, cert. denied, 357 U.S. 924
(1958); Parfums Stern v. United States Customs Service, 575 F.Supp. 416 (S.D. Fla. 1983);
Osawa & Co. v. B & H Photo, 589 F.Supp. 1163 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
316. United States v. Guerlain, Inc., 155 F. Supp. 77, 79 (S.D.N.Y. 1957).
317. Id. at 79.
318. Id. at 91.
319. Mackintosh, supra note 1, at 310.
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agencies were in disagreement as to how to interpret Section 526 in
light of the antitrust lawsY2 °
In Parfums Stern v. United States Customs Service,321 the District
Court for the Southern District of Florida held that plaintiff, a
subsidiary of a United States MNE, violated Sherman 2 by attempting
to invoke Section 526 to prevent gray market competition from its
own manufacturing sources. 32 The court concluded that Sherman 2
"did not permit exclusion of gray market goods imported by plaintiff's international affiliates and refused to enjoin importation of
these goods. ' 323 The finding that defendant attempted to monopolize
imports was similar to the holding of the trial court in Guerlain.3 24
Both Parfums Stern and Guerlain involved U.S. companies who
attempted to exclude competition from foreign manufacturers that
were under common control with the American companies. 32 Since
the United States Supreme Court in K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc.
held the "common control" exception valid, these types of companies
may have a more difficult time convincing the Customs Service to
exclude gray market goods, regardless of antitrust considerations.
The question of whether a private cause of action exists under Section
526, apart from the Supreme Court's construction of that statute
with respect to the Customs Service Regulations in K Mart Corp. v.
326
Cartier, Inc., remains to be answered.
Most recently, the District Court for the Southern District of New
York in Osawa & Co. v. B & H Photo rejected defendant's arguments
that an injunction excluding gray market goods would violate antitrust proscriptions against price discrimination, 327 or monopolization. 32 The Osawa court found that defendant had violated a Customs
Service exclusion order grounded on Section 526.329 Defendant claimed
that price differences between the markowner's goods and the gray
goods was a result of price discrimination in violation of antitrust
laws. 330 This claim was rejected for lack of proof and because plaintiff

320.
321.
322.
323.
324.
325.
326.
327.
328.
329.
330.

See Kersner and Stein, supra note 26, at 270-71.
Parfums Stern, 575 F.Supp. at 416.
Mackintosh, supra note I at 311.
Id.
Guerlain, 575 F.Supp. at 420.
See Parfums Stern, 575 F.Supp. at 418; and Guertain 155 F.Supp. at 79.
See supra text accompanying notes 278-85.
Osawa & Co. v. B & H Photo, 589 F.Supp. 1163, 1164 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
Id. at 1178.
Id. at 1165.
Id. at 1166.
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offered legitimate reasons for the price differences.a31 The Osawa
court engaged in a general discussion of antitrust principles to conclude that the attempt to exclude gray market goods would not, on
its own, be violative of antitrust law. 332 Analysis of the foregoing
cases indicates that American courts will continue to reject antitrust
claims when raised against companies that invoke Section 526 to halt
the importation of gray goods.
CONCLUSION

As one commentator has written, in any discussion of the merits
of gray market importation "[t]he equities of the respective [policy]

positions are delicately balanced

. . .

33

Obviously, the trademark

owner's property rights should be protected. This must include a
measure of protection against loss of goodwill due to the "unauthorized" importation of goods which do not meet appropriate

specifications for the domestic market (e.g. electrical current requirements or product operation instructions printed in a foreign language). On the other hand, when a trademark owner relinquishes the
exclusive right to the use of the mark and allows another to use it,
he has the ability to condition that use on the maintenance of the
mark's quality. He should not be allowed to complain later that
some products bearing his mark are of lesser quality than others,
and thus should be sold in segregated markets. But if the products
were simply designed for the requirements of a different market, the
mark owner is damaged by importation of the different goods and
should be given an adequate remedy. The American mark owner also
has a genuine argument that it is unfair for gray market goods to
"free ride" on the promotional and other expenses of the domestic
trademark owner.
The United States Government is compelled to make difficult
political and economic policy decisions in deciding the issues of the
gray market. The ramifications of a protectionist trade policy with
respect to the reaction of international trading partners may be
considerable. Economic effects, not only with respect to international
free trade, but also with respect to the interests of domestic consumers
must be considered. Any price reductions resulting from gray market
competition with "authorized" goods are a boon to American con-

331.
332.
333.

350

Id. at 1166.
Osawa & Co. v. B & H Photo, 589 F.Supp. 1163, 1176-78 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
Gerber & Bender, supra note 1, at 42.
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sumers. In K Mart Corp.
Court avoided addressing
based its decision to allow
goods unhindered by the

v. CartierInc. the United States Supreme
the complex policy issues presented and
the continued importation of gray market
Customs Service on the narrow issue of

statutory construction.
Until the Executive and Legislative branches decide upon a much

needed policy direction, K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc. represents the
latest indication on the status of the gray market in the United States.
The decision will not be the final word on the subject. Acting in
their own economic interest, American trademark owners affected
by the gray market have lobbied, 334 and will continue to lobby, for

a change in the law as a means to protect their profits and the
335
goodwill associated with their trademarks.

In view of the fact that the present posture of American law with
respect to the gray market may conflict with international treaty
obligations, and that "[v]irtually every economically significant for-

eign jurisdiction permits parallel importation,

' 336

pressure from the

334. Lobbying is defined as "[all attempts including personal solicitation to induce
legislators to vote in a certain way or to introduce legislation." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 854
(5th ed. 1979).
335. Senator Orrin Hatch (R-Utah) has introduced two bills that would make illegal the
importation of gray market goods: a pre-K Mart decision bill, introduced in September of
1987, (S.1671, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987)) and an October of 1988 bill tailored to supersede
the Supreme Court's ruling in K Mart allowing the importation of certain gray market goods
(S.2903, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. (1988)). See Legislation to Amend Lanham Act Would Ban
All Gray Market Imports 36 P.T.C.J. 708 (BNA Oct. 20, 1988). Bills supporting the Customs
Service policy of allowing the importation of certain gray market goods were also introduced
prior to the K Mart decision: (S.1079, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987) and H.R. 4803, 100th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1988)). Before either of these bills could be acted upon by Congress, the
Supreme Court decided K Mart. See also K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 108 S.Ct. 1811, 1819
(1988) citing, Eisler, Gray-Market Mayhem: It's Makers vs. Importers in Lobbying Onslaught,
Legal Times, Nov. 17, 1986, p. 1, col. 1.
336. Gorelick and Little, supra note 26, at 227. See generally Takamatsu, supra note 26,
at 442-43. The European Economic Community and Japan provide examples of how nations
in diverse parts of the world handle the gray market (or parallel importation). The policy of
the EEC has been to provide protection for those in the business of parallel importation as a
means to integrate national markets and facilitate the "Common Market" of European states.
For this reason, the EEC's policy goals toward the gray market are different than those of
the United States. Remington, supra note 255, at 101; see also, Recent Development, 1988

Review of the European Court of Justice, 2
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185 (1989).

Japan also permits parallel importation. "In a 1970 decision involving 'Parker' pens, the
Osaka District Court ruled that the Japanese trademark owner of 'Parker' products could not
bar others from importing genuine 'Parker' pens into Japan because parallel importation
encouragesfree competition and improves prices and services." Gorelick and Little, supra note
19, at 227 (emphasis added). Executive agencies of the Japanese government have also expressed
a policy of favoring parallel importation. Id. at 227. A 1972 Customs Duties Act regulation
authorized importation of "genuine trademarked goods if the domestic owner either holds the
foreign trademark or should be considered the same entity as the foreign trademark owner."
(Id. citing Takamatsu, supra note 26, at 442-43.) Japan's Fair Trade Commission expressed
its support for parallel importation by issuing guidelines which stated that hindrance of parallel
importation would be an unfair business practice. (Takamatsu, supra note 26, at 442).
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international community may also influence the eventual policy direction chosen by the United States Government.
Timothy J. Tomlin

